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PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION STATUTES AND SEXUAL
ORIENTATION: SHOULD THERE BE A RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTION FOR SECULAR BUSINESSES?
LUCIEN J. DHOOGE*
[T]he First Amendment is not a libertarian mani-
festo entitling businesses to operate without any
restrictions on their conduct in the marketplace.1
This isn’t 1964 anymore. . . . We’ve moved beyond
that. If you open up your doors to the general pub-
lic, you can’t pick and choose who you are going to
deal with.2
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the issue of whether there should be a
religious exemption for secular businesses from public accommoda-
tion statutes that protect prospective patrons from discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation. The Article examines this issue
in the context of protecting free exercise of religion versus offering
services to all members of the public equally and without distinction.
The Article concludes that the perceived threat to religious liberty
posed by such statutes is exaggerated, that the consequences of
granting exemptions would be harmful, and that state-sanctioned
discrimination is contrary to the fundamental principles of justice
and equality underlying the U.S. legal system.
INTRODUCTION
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
II. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION STATUTES AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
A. A Brief History of Public Accommodation Statutes
B. A Comparative Analysis of State Public Accommodation
Statutes and Sexual Orientation
* Sue and John Staton Professor of Law, Scheller College of Business, Georgia Insti-
tute of Technology.
1. Answer Brief of Appellee-Respondent Vanessa Willock at 39, Elane Photography,
L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (No. 33687).
2. Adam Nagourney, Arizona Bill Stirred Alarm in the G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2014, at A11 (quoting former Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating).
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INTRODUCTION
The past year has been characterized by enormous strides toward
full equality for the LGBT community. The U.S. Supreme Court’s
opinion in United States v. Windsor has been followed by an uninter-
rupted string of victories on the issue of marriage equality in federal
district courts and state courts.3 The most recent successes in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit mark the first time that a fed-
eral circuit court of appeals has upheld the right of same-sex couples
to marry.4 A growing number of states, thirty-one in all, prohibit
3. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–96 (2013) (holding that Section 3 of the Defense of Mar-
riage Act denying federal recognition of same-sex marriages was a violation of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause); see also Emily Bazelon, Who Needs the Supreme
Court?, SLATE (May 20, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurispru
dence/2014/05/with_pennsylvania_gay_marriage_gets_its-8th_straight
_win_who_needs_the.html, archived at http://perma.cc/LP9S-BLMP (documenting the
unbroken line of judicial opinions striking down bans on same-sex marriage and the
speed at which marriage equality is occurring post-Windsor); Out for Freedom, AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION (2014), http://www.aclu.org/out-freedom, archived at http://perma
.cc/75QE-SBDY (noting that six states legalized same-sex marriage after the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Windsor and that forty-four percent of the U.S. population lives in
states where same-sex marriage is legal). There were fifty-five marriage equality
lawsuits pending in federal court, twenty-nine marriage equality lawsuits pending in state
court, and at least one lawsuit pending in every state that did not permit same-sex couples
to marry at the time of the publication of this Article. See Pending Marriage Equality
Cases, LAMBDA LEGAL (last updated Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.lambdalegal.org/pending
-marriage-equality-cases, archived at http://www.perma.cc/MQ8Y-R7NG.
4. See Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1079-82 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that Okla-
homa’s prohibition upon same-sex marriage violated the Due Process and Equal Protection
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discrimination in private or public employment or both on the basis
of sexual orientation with a smaller number of states extending pro-
tection on the basis of gender identity.5 A further blow for equality
was struck in July 2014 with the issuance of a long-awaited executive
order protecting federal government employees from discrimination
on the basis of gender identity and prohibiting federal contractors
from engaging in employment discrimination against members of
the LGBT community.6 These developments come on the heels of
public opinion polls evidencing shifting attitudes toward homo-
sexuality and greater social acceptance of the LGBT community.7
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution); see also Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1229-30 (10th
Cir. 2014) (holding that Utah’s prohibition upon same-sex marriage violated the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution). The Tenth Circuit’s
opinions were followed shortly thereafter by an opinion of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals reaching the same conclusion. See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir.
2014) (holding that Virginia’s prohibition upon same-sex marriage violated the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution). But see Deboer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d
388, 399-419 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 624 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015)
(holding that same-sex couples do not have a fundamental constitutional right to marry
and states are free to deny recognition to same-sex marriages performed in other states).
5. LAMBDA LEGAL, In Your State (2014), http://www.lambdalegal.org/states-regions,
archived at http://perma.cc/W6XM-S2CF.
6. Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42971 §§ 1–2 (July 21, 2014), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-07-23/pdf/2014-17522.pdf, archived at http://perma
.cc/XN89-MZS9; see also Press Release, The White House, Taking Action to Support
LGBT Workplace Equality is Good for Business (July 21, 2014), (on file with author)
(contending that employers recognize that workplace equality is in their best interest and
that equality is supported by U.S. public opinion, state and local governments, and some
faith communities).
7. See, e.g., William Harms, Americans Move Dramatically Toward Acceptance of
Homosexuality, Survey Finds, UCHICAGO NEWS (Sept. 28, 2011), http://news.uchicago
.edu/article/2011/09/28/americans-move-dramatically-toward-acceptance-of
homosexuality-survey-finds, archived at http://perma.cc/7D5Z-NZ38 (summarizing the
results of a survey conducted by NORC which concluded that “Americans overwhelmingly
support basic civil liberties and freedom of expression for gays and lesbians”); Frank
Newport & Igor Himelfarb, In U.S., Record-High Say Gay, Lesbian Relations Morally
OK, GALLUP (May 20, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162689/record-high-say-gay
-lesbian-relations-morally.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/B2Z9-7YZ8 (summarizing
a Gallup Poll in which 59% of the survey pool found gay and lesbian relations morally
acceptable); Warren Richey, Polls Finds Broad, Rapid Shift Among Americans Toward Gay
Marriage, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 27, 2014, available at http://www.csmonitor.com
/USA/Politics/2014/0327/poll-finds-broad-rapid-shift-among-Americans-toward-gay-mar
riage, archived at http://perma.cc/CMJ8-G9NJ (summarizing the results of a Greenberg
Quinlan Rosner Research poll); Carrie Wofford, Why Equality Is Winning, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 26, 2014, available at http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/carrie
-wofford/2014/03/26/how-did-public-opinion-on-gay-marriage-shift-so-quickly, archived
at http://perma.cc/HNE4-835M (concluding that “gay rights are suddenly ascendant” and
attributing their rapid rise to efforts to encourage members of the LGBT community to
self-identify in the 1970s and characterize same-sex marriage as encouraging, loving,
and committed relationships).
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The ascendancy of gay rights has been accompanied by a rise in
assertions of religious freedom.8 Efforts to protect free exercise and
restore religious freedom have primarily taken the form of state legis-
lative initiatives. One such example was Arizona Senate Bill 1062,
which was vetoed by Governor Jan Brewer in February 2014.9 The
bill prohibited state action substantially burdening the exercise of
religion by any individual, business association, trust, foundation,
church or religious organization in the absence of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest advanced by the least restrictive means.10 This
restriction upon state action applied to facially neutral laws, laws
of general applicability and in judicial and administrative proceed-
ings regardless of whether the government was a party.11 Protected
persons could not be compelled to act or prohibited from acting if
such act or refusal was “substantially motivated by a religious belief,
whether or not the exercise [was] compulsory or central to a larger
system of religious belief.”12 The bill was condemned by a variety of
national and state political officials and members of the business
community as permitting a wide range of denials of service under
the guise of religion, allowing use of religion as “a fig leaf for prejudice”
and potentially resulting in unintended consequences with negative
financial impacts upon the state.13 However, one such consequence
8. See, e.g., Adam Serwer, Religious Freedom Used to Chip Away at LGBT Rights,
MSNBC (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/religious-freedom-chip-away-gay
-rights, archived at http://perma.cc/LR64-4ANR (describing gay rights from the viewpoint
of social conservatives as an issue of religious freedom); Amy Stone, The New Religious
Freedom Argument: Gay Marriage in the 2012 Election, POL. RES. ASSOCIATES. (Oct. 30,
2012), http://www.politicalresearch.org/2012/10/30/the-new-religious-freedom-argument
-gay-marriage-in-the-2012-election, archived at http://perma.cc/GFW8-GN8Y (describing
same-sex marriage as “the weapon that will be and is being used to marginalize and
repress Christianity and the church” and utilization of religious freedom arguments as
a means by which to appeal to evangelical Christians, libertarians, and moderates). But
see Cathy Lynn Grossman, Survey: Americans Turn Sharply Favorable on Gay Issues,
WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/religion
/survey-americans-turn-sharply-favorable-on-gay-issues/2014/02/26, archived at http://
perma.cc/S2K-AKKP (citing a survey conducted by the Public Religion Research Institute
which found that nearly one in four people who left their childhood religion were motivated
to do so by their former churches’ negative teachings or treatment of the LGBT community
as an important factor).
9. See Fernanda Santos, Arizona Vetoes Right to Refuse Service to Gays, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 2014, at A1.
10. S.B. 1062, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. §§ 1(5), 2(B), 2(C) (1–2) (Ariz. 2014).
11. Id. § 2(A-B), (D).
12. Id. § 1(2).
13. See, e.g., Santos, supra note 9 (describing opposition by former presidential candi-
date Mitt Romney, U.S. Senator John McCain, and Florida Governor Rick Scott and pos-
sible relocation of the 2015 Super Bowl from Phoenix); Laurie Roberts, Governor Brewer:
Save Us from Crazy, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.azcentral.com/story
/laurie-roberts/2014/02/24/gov-brewer-save-us-from-crazy/5710245, archived at http://
perma.cc/X8VH-2VXK (minimizing the threat to religious freedom and asking Governor
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clearly intended by the bill was to grant business owners the right
to refuse service to the LGBT community based upon religiously
motivated beliefs.14
The controversy did not end with Governor Brewer’s veto. Sup-
porters of the failed Arizona bill expressed disappointment and cited
perceived growing threats and hostility to religious liberty.15 These
perceived threats were evident in legislation introduced in numer-
ous statehouses purporting to shield the free exercise of religion in
the context of public accommodations.16 The introduction of such
measures represented a revival of state legislative efforts which had
Brewer to “calm the hysteria . . . save us from another round of crazy. . . . [and] [v]eto
this vile bill”); Fernanda Santos, Governor of Arizona is Pressed to Veto Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 2014, at A12 (describing opposition by U.S. Senators John McCain and Jeffrey
Flake, Mayor Scott Smith of Mesa, Arizona, the Greater Phoenix Economic Council,
Apple, Inc. and American Airlines).
14. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, After Veto in Arizona, Conservatives Vow to Fight for
Religious Liberties, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics
/after-veto-in-arizona-conservatives-vow-to-f ight-for-religious-liberties/2014
/02/27/4e0f877a-9fcb-11e3-b8d8-94557ff66b28_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc
/KAG7-P39V (quoting Peter Sprigg, a senior fellow for policy studies at the Family
Research Council, as stating “[t]here is a sense of alarm within the pro-family movement
and among conservative Christians that there [are] growing threats to religious liberty,
and many of those threats do relate to the agenda of the sexual revolutionaries”).
15. See, e.g., id. (in which a commentator expressed concern about “a public that is
hostile to the very idea of religious liberty”); Bob Christie, Religious Freedom Bill Riles
Gay Rights Supporters, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 21, 2014, http://bigstory.ap.org/article
/gay-rights-groups-oppose-religious-protection-bill, archived at http://perma.cc/9X7Z-UKLG
(in which Josh Kredit, legal counsel for the Center for Arizona Policy, stated that there is
“a growing hostility toward religion”).
16. See, e.g., S.B. 377, 152d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(a) (Ga. 2014) (prohibiting state entities
from substantially burdening the free exercise rights of any individual, business association
or trust in the absence of a compelling governmental interest advanced by the least
restrictive means even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability); H.B.
426, 62d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 1 (Idaho 2014) (prohibiting state occupational licensing
boards and governmental subdivisions from denying, revoking or suspending a person’s
occupational or professional license, certificate or registration on the basis of business-
related decisions in accordance with sincerely held religious beliefs or the exercise of
religion relating to employment, client selection, and financial affairs); H.B. 2453, 100th
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(a) (Kan. 2014) (exempting all individuals and business associations
from providing services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges re-
lated to the celebration of any civil union, domestic partnership or marriage not recognized
by the state if so doing would violate sincerely held religious beliefs); S.B. 128, 89th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. §§ 2, 3(3) (S.D. 2014) (prohibiting any person or entity from initiating liti-
gation against a business for refusing to serve an individual or couple on the basis of
sexual orientation, levying punitive damages in an amount no less than $2000 against
any person filing such litigation and barring enforcement of any federal recognition of
sexual orientation as a protected class); S.B. 2566, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 1(a)(3),
1(b)(1)(A) (Tenn. 2014) (exempting all individuals, business associations and trusts from
providing services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges related to
the celebration of any civil union, domestic partnership or marriage not recognized by the
state if so doing would violate sincerely held religious beliefs).
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been relatively moribund since the late 1990s.17 Although most of
these recent efforts failed, they were successful in Mississippi,18 which
joined sixteen other states with express legislative provisions pur-
porting to protect the free exercise of religion.19
These efforts will undoubtedly be revived in upcoming legislative
sessions in many parts of the country. They will also increasingly
focus on judicial challenges to federal and state legislation that are
perceived to be hostile to religious freedom. Judicial challenges will
undoubtedly focus on the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., in which the Court held that privately
owned for-profit business associations possessed religious rights.20
The Court’s utilization of the compelling governmental interest and
least-restrictive-means standards sets a high bar for other perceived
governmental interferences with religious practices.21 Of specific
interest in the area of public accommodations is the Court’s refusal
to grant individuals and business associations the right to engage
in racial discrimination in the name of free exercise.22 While com-
mendable, such a limitation was entirely predictable and leaves the
door ajar for other forms of discrimination such as discrimination
based on gender and actual or perceived sexual orientation. The full
implications of Hobby Lobby remain to be determined, but it can be
predicted with a high degree of confidence that the opinion will
17. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs,
55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 475 (2010) (noting that ten states adopted religious freedom restoration
acts between 1998 and 2000 but only three had done so in the following ten years).
18. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-61-5(b)(i)-(ii) (West 2014) (prohibiting the state from
substantially burdening the free exercise rights of any person in the absence of a com-
pelling governmental interest advanced by the least restrictive means); see also
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mississippi: Bill to Shield Religious Practices Passes, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2014, at A15, available at http://nytimes.com/2014/04/02/US/mississippi-bill-to
-shield-religious-practices-passes.html?_r=1, archived at http://perma.cc/VAG3-LT36.
19. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1493 to -1493.02 (2014) (adopted 1999); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-571b(a)–(f) (West 2014) (adopted 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01–.05
(West 2014) (adopted 1998); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 73-401 to -404 (West 2014) (adopted
2000); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1-99 (West 2014) (adopted 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 60-5301 to -5307 (West 2014) (adopted 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (West
2014) (adopted 2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.302.1 (West 2014) (adopted 2004); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 28-22-2 to 28-22-5 (West 2014) (adopted 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 251-258
(West 2014) (adopted 2000); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2401–2407 (West 2014) (adopted
2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-80.1-1 to -4 (West 2014) (adopted 1998); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1-32-10 to -60 (2014) (adopted 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407 (West 2014) (adopted
2009); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.001-.012 (West 2014) (adopted 1999); VA.
CODE ANN. § 57-2.02(A)-(F) (West 2014) (adopted 2007).
20. No. 13-354, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505, at *39–*40, *44–*50 (U.S. June 30, 2014); see
also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5302(f) (West 2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-20(3) (2014)
(providing that privately-owned for-profit business associations possess religious rights).
21. Hobby Lobby Stores, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505, at *77.
22. Id. at *87.
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serve as the basis for challenges to federal and state laws for the
foreseeable future.
One of the sources of perceived threats to religious freedom is
public accommodation statutes. This was the specific circumstance
in two well-publicized cases involving religious objections to provid-
ing goods and services to same-sex couples celebrating marriages or
civil unions.23 Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia pro-
hibit businesses deemed to be public accommodations from refusing
to serve prospective patrons on the basis of sexual orientation.24
These statutes also prohibit a wide range of associated behaviors,
such as aiding and abetting discrimination, refusing accommodation
to those who associate with members of the LGBT community and
posting notices of the right to refuse service.25
This Article examines the issue of whether there should be a re-
ligious exemption for secular businesses from public accommodation
statutes that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion.26 The Article first briefly reviews the history of the free exer-
cise of religion and public accommodation statutes. The Article then
compares and contrasts public accommodation statutes extending
23. See Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 62–68 (N.M. 2013) (holding
that the refusal of a wedding photography business to photograph a same-sex commitment
ceremony violated the New Mexico Human Rights Act); see also Craig v. Masterpiece Cake-
shop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008, at 1–2 (Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n May 30, 2014) (final
agency order) (upholding an administrative law judge’s determination that the refusal by
a bakery to prepare a wedding cake for a same-sex couple violated Colorado’s public ac-
commodation statute).
24. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51–51.2, 51.5 (West 2014) (adopted 2005); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 24-34-601 (West 2014) (adopted 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a–81d, 46a-81p
(West 2014) (adopted 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 4501–4504 (West 2014) (adopted
2009); D.C. CODE §§ 2-1401.02 to .03, 2-1402.01, 2-1402.31 (2014) (adopted 1977); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 489-2 to -5 (West 2014) (adopted 2006); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-101
to 103, 5/8A-104 (West 2014) (adopted 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.7 (West 2014) (adopted
2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4591–4592 (2014) (adopted 2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (West 2014) (adopted 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363A.02–.03,
363A.11, 363A.24 (West 2014) (adopted 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 233.010,
651.050–.070 (West 2014) (adopted 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:16–17 (West
2014) (adopted 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4 to -5 (West 2014) (adopted 1992); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 28-1-2, 28-1-7, 28-1-9 (West 2014) (adopted 2004); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290–92,
296 (McKinney 2014) (adopted 2002); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 659A.003, 659A.005–.006,
659A.406–09, 659A.885 (West 2014) (adopted 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 11-24-2 to
-2.1 (West 2014) (adopted 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502 (West 2014) (adopted 1991);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.030, 49.60.215 (West 2014) (adopted 2006); WIS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 106.52 (West 2014) (adopted 2009); Fairness for All Marylanders Act of 2014,
2014 Md. Laws ch. 474 (to be codified at MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T §§ 20-101, 20-301
to -304 (2014)) (adopted 2014).
25. See infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
26. By “secular businesses,” the author is referring to those which are not religious
or otherwise connected with a church or other place of worship. See WEBSTER’S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 577 (2d ed. 2002).
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protection to prospective patrons on the basis of sexual orientation.
The Article examines the possible consequences associated with grant-
ing religious exemptions based upon actual or perceived sexual orien-
tation. The Article concludes that the perceived threat to religious
liberty is exaggerated, the consequences of granting exemptions
would be harmful, and that state-sanctioned discrimination is con-
trary to the fundamental principles of justice and equality underlying
the U.S. legal system.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in part,
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” 27 Since its inception,
free exercise jurisprudence has focused on differentiating between
legitimate government regulation of religious conduct as opposed to
impermissible control of beliefs and the circumstances, if any, under
which individuals may claim exemptions from government laws that
impact religious practices.28 Although the federal government occa-
sionally granted exemptions to specific programs, these exemptions
were largely statutory, based upon principles of conscience rather than
exclusively religious objections, and were limited to a narrow set of
activities.29 Early U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence refused to grant
religious exemptions to government laws on the basis of the Free
Exercise Clause.30 The few exemptions upheld by the Court prior to
the 1960s were based on other grounds such as free speech or due
process.31 The conclusion to be drawn from these opinions was that
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
28. See Eric D. Yordy, Fixing Free Exercise: A Compelling Need to Relieve the Current
Burdens, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 191, 192 (2009) (discussing the regulation of religiously
motivated conduct in early U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence); see also Erin N. East,
Comment, I Object: The RLUIPA as a Model for Protecting the Conscience Rights of Reli-
gious Objectors to Same-Sex Relationships, 59 EMORY L.J. 259, 276–77 (2009) (discussing
the history of free exercise jurisprudence in the U.S. Supreme Court).
29. The primary examples in this regard are the exemptions from military service
provided to conscientious objectors pursuant to the Draft Acts of 1864 and 1917 and the
1940 Selective Service Act. See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION:
FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 49 (2006) (stating that “excusing people from military service
remains the quintessential exemption, against which we can compare many other conflicts
of legal duty and religious conscience”); see also East, supra note 28, at 276–77 (discussing
the statutory nature of conscience-based exemptions from government programs in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
30. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (upholding laws prohib-
iting polygamy and stating that “[l]aws are made for the government of actions, and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”).
31. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633–34, 642 (1943)
(holding that the children of Jehovah’s Witnesses could not be compelled to recite the
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the Free Exercise Clause was not an effective means by which to
secure exemptions from secular statutes of general application.32
The existing case law proved inadequate in addressing clashes
between religious duties and secular legal obligations.33 The Court’s
apparent reluctance to utilize the Free Exercise Clause as a basis for
addressing these conflicts also changed in the intervening two decades.
This new approach was annunciated in 1963 in Sherbert v. Verner in
which the Court held that the religious practices of a member of the
Seventh-Day Adventist Church who lost her job due to her refusal
to work on Saturdays and was consequently denied unemployment
compensation were unconstitutionally burdened.34
The Court upheld its previous determination that religiously
motivated acts, as contrasted with beliefs, were “not totally free
from legislative restrictions.” 35 However, the Court also noted that
the conduct deemed subject to permissible regulation in past cases
“invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or
order.” 36 Such instances, implicating “[o]nly the gravest abuses [and]
endangering paramount interests,” permitted limitations on the basis
pledge of allegiance in public schools on the basis of the compelled speech doctrine);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306–07 (1940) (overturning the conviction of sev-
eral Jehovah’s Witnesses for violating a Connecticut statute prohibiting solicitation
without a state license on the basis that its application to religious activities deprived
the defendants of liberty without due process of law); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534–36 (1925) (invalidating an Oregon law requiring children to attend public
schools as opposed to private, parochial and religious schools on the basis of due process).
32. See, e.g., East, supra note 28, at 277 (describing early U.S. Supreme Court juris-
prudence as “suggest[ing] that the Free Exercise Clause did not contemplate exemptions
from government laws or policies”); Claire McCusker, Comment, When Church and State
Collide: Averting Democratic Disaffection in a Post-Smith World, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
391, 393 (2007) (“During this period, it appeared clear that religious practices must give
way to generally applicable secular statutes.”); Yordy, supra note 28, at 192 (“From the
beginning, free exercise of religion was not an unlimited license to behave in any way
one saw fit.”).
33. See, e.g., Yordy, supra note 28, at 192–93 (criticizing U.S. Supreme Court jurispru-
dence regarding free exercise claims prior to the 1960s on the basis that it failed to give
guidance as to permissible amounts of regulation, did not provide a clear standard by which
to determine the constitutionality of such regulation and decided claims on a case-by-case
basis which “was neither a model of judicial efficiency nor helpful to decision makers”).
34. 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
35. Id. at 403 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961)). The Court also
affirmed its previous determination that “[t]he door of the Free Exercise Clause stands
tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs . . .” and that the
“[g]overnment may neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief . . . nor penalize or dis-
criminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to
the authorities . . . .” Id. at 402 (citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Fowler
v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303 (emphasis omitted)).
36. Id. at 403 (citing Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18 (1946) (polygamy and
bigamy); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 171 (1944) (child labor); Jacobson v. Mas-
sachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1905) (mandatory smallpox vaccination program); Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (polygamy)).
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of their compelling nature.37 The asserted state interests in this case,
specifically, the possibility of the filing of fraudulent claims by persons
feigning religious objections to Saturday work and their effect upon
the state unemployment fund and employers, did not rise to the level
of compelling state interests.38
Furthermore, even assuming the filing of spurious claims and
consequent harm to the unemployment fund and employers, the State
failed to “demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would
combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights.” 39
It was irrelevant to the Court that the determination of ineligibility
imposed an indirect burden on religious practices rather than a direct
burden such as may be associated with criminal sanctions.40 Rather,
the denial of eligibility forced Sherbert to “choose between following
the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits . . . and abandon-
ing one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work . . . .”41
The affirmation of these standards by the Court nine years later in
Wisconsin v. Yoder seemingly cemented into law the government’s
substantial burden of demonstrating that regulation of religiously
motivated actions could only be sustained if they were narrowly
circumscribed to satisfy a compelling state interest.42 This apparent
clarity proved to be short-lived.43
37. Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
38. Id. at 407.
39. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
40. Id. at 404. In concluding that the absence of direct restraints or punishments did
not immunize legislation from burdening free exercise, the Court analogized to speech and
assembly cases in which it concluded that “indirect discouragements undoubtedly have the
same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines,
injunctions or taxes.” Id. at 404 n.5 (quoting Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
402 (1950)).
41. Id. at 404. In dissent, Justice Harlan described the Court’s conclusion as “disturbing
both in its rejection of existing precedent and in its implications for the future.” Id. at 418
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan contended that the Court’s conclusion overruled
existing precedent sustaining the application of Sunday closing laws to businesses
operated by Orthodox Jews. Id. at 421 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605–07
(1961)). Justice Harlan also concluded that the Court’s holding granted special treatment
to those refusing Saturday work on religious grounds while denying assistance to others
whose identical behavior was not religiously motivated. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 421–22.
42. 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (overturning a state compulsory education statute as
applied to Amish children). The Court defined the compelling government interest test
as requiring a searching examination of the interests the government sought to promote
and impediments to these objectives that would result from recognition of an exemption
for fundamental claims of religious freedom. Id. at 235. Applying this standard, the
Court found the state’s purported interests in preparing students for participation in the
political system and protecting them from ignorance and exploitation by prospective
employers were not compelling with respect to Amish children. Id. at 222, 234. The Court
reached this conclusion despite the state government’s unquestioned authority over edu-
cation and the facial neutrality of the compulsory attendance statute. Id. at 220.
43. But see Yordy, supra note 28, at 194 (contending that the standards established
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The Court changed the standard for resolving conflicts between
secular statutes and religiously motivated conduct twenty-seven
years after Sherbert in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith.44 The Court was confronted with a
conflict between Oregon’s narcotics laws prohibiting the knowing or
intentional possession of controlled substances without a prescrip-
tion from a medical practitioner and free exercise claims of the right
to use peyote for sacramental purposes.45 In upholding the denial of
unemployment benefits, the Court refused to excuse individuals from
compliance with “a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his
religion prescribes (or proscribes).’ ” 46 The Free Exercise Clause was
not violated as the prohibition upon a specific religious practice was
“merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise
valid provision.” 47 To hold otherwise would “permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself.” 48 The creation of “a private right to
ignore generally applicable laws” would not only invite anarchy but
would also contradict “constitutional tradition and common sense.” 49
The government’s ability to execute public policy, including enforce-
ment of prohibitions upon conduct perceived to be harmful to soci-
ety, could not depend on its effect on the spiritual development of
religious objectors.50
Furthermore, laws implementing such public policy would most
likely be unable to survive undiluted application of the compelling
interest test.51 The sheer diversity of religious beliefs and practices
in the United States deprived the Court of “the luxury of deeming
presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every
by Sherbert and Yoder were never clear due to the Court’s failure to define the terms
“compelling state interest” and “burden on religion”).
44. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
45. Id. at 874. Oregon law classified peyote as a Schedule I controlled substance the
unauthorized possession of which was a felony. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 475.992(4)(a)
(West 1987); Or. Admin. R. 855-080-0021(3) (1988). Alfred Smith and Galen Black were
fired from their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation organization because of their use of
peyote at a ceremony of the Native American Church to which they belonged. Smith, 494
U.S. at 874. The Oregon Employment Division deemed them ineligible for unemployment
benefits as it determined that they had been discharged for job-related misconduct. Id.
Smith and Black contended that this denial was in contravention of their free exercise
rights to consume peyote for sacramental purposes. Id.
46. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
47. Id. at 878.
48. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1879)).
49. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885–86.
50. Id. at 885 (citing Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439,
451 (1988)).
51. Id. at 888.
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regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest
order.” 52 Granting free exercise considerations primacy would “open
the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from
civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”53 The Court listed
several different types of laws for which exemptions would have to be
created should it apply the compelling interest test to all actions be-
lieved to be religiously commanded.54 The Court subsequently reaf-
firmed Smith’s conclusion that the government needs to satisfy the
compelling interest test only when reviewing laws targeting specific
religious practices rather than those deemed of general applicability.55
52. Id. (emphasis omitted).
53. Id. However, the Court also noted that when the government creates individualized
exemptions for secular purposes, it may not refuse to extend those exemptions to cases
of “ ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.” Id. at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)). Some commentators have contended that this language may
create an additional test independent of the neutrality and general applicability require-
ments. See, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck: The General
Applicability Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
627, 636 (2003). But see Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free
Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 850, 861 (2001) (stating that the extension of secular exemptions to cases of religious
hardship is not a separate requirement but rather “is best understood as nothing more
than a subset of the general applicability requirement”); Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The
Devil is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions from Smith,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1062 (2000) (“[C]ourts conflate the ‘generally applicable’ inquiry
with the ‘individualized exemptions’ analysis, reasoning that where a law contains a
system of individualized exemptions it cannot be generally applicable.”).
54. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888–89. These laws included compulsory military service, the
payment of taxes, health and safety regulations, compulsory vaccination requirements,
drug laws, traffic laws, certain types of social welfare legislation, child labor laws,
prohibitions upon animal cruelty, environmental protection laws, and laws prohibiting
racial discrimination. Id. But see id. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting the
majority’s “parade of horribles” as a basis for abandoning the compelling interest test
and its capable application by courts in striking “sensible balances between religious
liberty and competing state interests”). Justice O’Connor noted that neutral laws of
general applicability were equally capable of interfering with religious practices as laws
expressly targeting religion. Id. at 901. Nevertheless, the governmental interest in
regulating peyote use was compelling, and accommodation of contrary religious beliefs
would unduly interfere with this interest. Id. at 907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dis-
sent contended that Oregon’s interests were abstract, the supposed harm from granting
an exemption was speculative, and the majority sacrificed individual interests in favor
of the “rarified values” associated with fundamental concerns of government. Id. at
910–11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Morris Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise
Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 330–31 (1969)).
55. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
537–39 (1993) (holding that application of ordinances prohibiting animal cruelty to ritual
animal sacrifice was intended to single out the practices of a discreet religious group for
condemnation, was not compelled by the government’s interests in protecting public health
and preventing cruelty to animals and could have been more narrowly tailored to address
specific issues concerning disposal of organic waste). In so concluding, the Court reiterated
its holding in Smith that “a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be
justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of
burdening a particular religious practice.” Id. at 531. The Court dismissed the need to
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The Court’s opinion in Smith was subject to criticism within the
academic community.56 There was also a reaction in the U.S. Congress.
After unsuccessful efforts in 1991 and 1992, Congress succeeded in
passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993.57 Signed by
President Clinton on November 16, 1993, the purpose of the Act was
“to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in [Sherbert] and
[Yoder] and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exer-
cise of religion is substantially burdened . . . .” 58 In so doing, the Act
provided that the “[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, except . . . in furtherance of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest; and . . . [if the law] is the least restrictive means
of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 59 The Act’s pas-
sage provoked considerable debate about its constitutionality.60 The
U.S. Supreme Court settled this issue with respect to state and local
law in 1997 in City of Boerne v. Flores in which it held that the Act
violated Congress’s power pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment
by expanding the coverage of the First Amendment in contravention
of the states’ authority to regulate the welfare of its citizens.61 The
“define with precision the standard used to evaluate whether a prohibition is of general
application” as the ordinances at issue fell far below acceptable constitutional standards.
Id. at 543.
56. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1,
3–4 (1990) (contending that Smith was inconsistent with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and existing precedent and expressing concern that it would not be effective
in preventing religious persecution); Lund, supra note 17, at 471 (criticizing the conclusion
in Smith that “[t]o the extent secular law clashes with religious obligation, religious obli-
gation generally loses”); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding
of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1455 (1990) (arguing that the in-
clusion of religious liberty in the Bill of Rights provided it with special protection from gov-
ernment interference); Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU
L. REV. 117, 134 (1993) (contending that Smith would subject the practices of minority
religions to the whims of the majority). But see Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative
Codification of Religious Liberty, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 565, 568–77 (1999) (rebutting claims
that the outcome in Smith gutted otherwise vibrant free exercise principles).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2012).
58. Id. § 2000bb-1(b)(1).
59. Id. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b)(1)-(2).
60. See Yordy, supra note 28, at 198–99 (summarizing the arguments relating to the
constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as it applied to federal and
state law).
61. 521 U.S. 507, 532–36 (1997) (challenging the denial of a building permit to enlarge
a Catholic church pursuant to a historical preservation ordinance). The opinion in Flores
was silent on the issue of the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as
applied to federal statutes. This issue was ultimately resolved by the Court in 2006. See
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006)
(upholding the granting of a preliminary injunction preventing application of the Controlled
Substances Act to a religious sect that consumed sacramental tea containing the hallu-
cinogen dimethyltryptamine listed as a controlled substance pursuant to federal law).
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response of some states to Flores was the adoption of their own
versions of religious freedom restoration acts.62
II. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION STATUTES AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
A. A Brief History of Public Accommodation Statutes
The history of public accommodation statutes may be traced to
the post–Civil War era. The first national effort was the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 which prohibited discrimination on the basis of race in
access to lodging, public conveyances, and places of amusement.63
This early effort is notable for its focus on race and narrow definition
of public accommodations.64 This effort proved short-lived however,
having been invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1883.65 As a
result, responsibility for prohibiting discrimination in access to public
62. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text. The U.S. Congress responded to
Flores by adopting the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2012). Signed by President Clinton in 2000, RLUIPA prohibits land
use regulations that impose substantial burdens upon the free exercise rights of persons
unless the government can demonstrate that the burdens further a compelling state
interest and are the least restrictive means of furthering such interest. Id. § 2000cc(a)(1).
The same standard is applicable to substantial burdens placed upon the free exercise
rights of incarcerated persons. Id. § 2000cc-1(a). RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” to
include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief.” Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). This definition is mirrored in several state religious
freedom restoration acts. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493(2) (2014); FLA.
STAT.ANN. § 761.02(3) (West 2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-401(2) (West 2014); 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1-5 (West 2014); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.302.2 (West 2014) (defining
“exercise of religion” as “an act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by religious
belief, whether or not the religious exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of
religious belief”); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-2(A) (West 2014) (defining the “exercise
of religion” as “an act or a refusal to act that is substantially motivated by religious
belief”). But see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5302(c) (West 2014); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 110.001(a)(1) (West 2014) (requiring any act or refusal to act to be substantially
motivated by a sincerely held religious tenet or belief). The religious freedom restoration
acts in Mississippi, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia do
not contain explicit definitions of the term “exercise of religion.”
63. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875), invalidated by The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
64. Id. (prohibiting race discrimination with respect to “accommodations, advantages,
facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other
places of public amusement”); see also James M. Gottry, Note, Just Shoot Me: Public
Accommodation Anti-Discrimination Laws Take Aim at First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 64 VAND. L. REV. 961, 965–66 (2011) (discussing the limited reach of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875).
65. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24–26. The Court held that the protections afforded
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution were only applicable to “state
action” rather than private discriminatory acts. Id. at 11. The Thirteenth Amendment
could not serve as a basis for the Act as it prohibited slavery, and its reach did not include
“ordinary civil injur[ies]” one might suffer as a result of an act of discrimination. Id. at 24.
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accommodations fell to the states by default until the adoption of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.66
The states’ record on protecting access to public accommodations
in the eighty-one years between the decision in The Civil Rights Cases
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was fragmented and deficient. Massa-
chusetts was the only state to adopt a public accommodation statute
prohibiting race discrimination prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1875.67
Other states adopted similar legislation after The Civil Rights Cases,
but enactment of such laws was largely a matter of geography with
some states in the northern and western United States outlawing
discrimination while Southern states codified segregation.68 Prog-
ress was excruciatingly slow. By the mid-twentieth century, only eigh-
teen states had adopted legislation prohibiting racial discrimination
in public accommodations.69 These statutes were generally restricted
to discrimination on the basis of race or color in a narrowly defined
group of accommodations.70
The U.S. Government re-entered the area with the adoption of
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.71 Although a historic milestone,
the Act is somewhat timid by modern standards in its adherence to
the narrow nineteenth century iteration of public accommodation
law.72 Prohibited discrimination was restricted solely to race, color,
religion, and national origin.73 Covered accommodations were limited
66. See Gottry, supra note 64, at 965; see also Justin Muehlmeyer, Toward a New Age
of Consumer Access Rights: Creating a Space in the Public Accommodation for the LGBT
Community, 19 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 781, 786–87 (2013).
67. See Act Forbidding Unjust Discrimination on Account of Color or Race, 1865 Mass.
Acts ch. 277, § 1, reprinted in MILTON KONVITZ, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 156 (1961)
(prohibiting discrimination “in any licensed inn, in any public place of amusement, public
conveyance or public meeting”).
68. Eleven northern and western states, led by New York and Kansas, adopted statutes
outlawing racial discrimination in public accommodations between 1883 and 1885. See
Lisa Gabrielle Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Discrimination in Access to Public Places:
A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 215, 238–39 (1978). By contrast, Tennessee was the only state in the former
Confederacy to adopt a similar law prior to the mid-twentieth century. Id. at 239.
69. Id. at 239–40. In fact, by 1950, the number of states with statutes authorizing segre-
gation in public accommodations exceeded the number of states with laws prohibiting such
discrimination. Id. at 240.
70. Id. at 240; see also Muehlmeyer, supra note 66, at 788 (noting that early public ac-
commodation laws prohibited discrimination on the basis of race and color in “a short list
of places . . . . [such as] ‘inns, taverns, hotels, public conveyances, restaurants, theaters, and
barber shops’ ” (quoting Lerman, supra note 68, at 240)); Gottry, supra note 64, at 966
(noting that the Massachusetts public accommodations statute only prohibited discrimi-
nation in places providing “essential goods and services”).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012).
72. See Muehlmeyer, supra note 66, at 789 (criticizing Title II for its close adherence
to the “Nineteenth Century Interpretation” of public accommodations).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012) (“All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations
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to four discreet categories.74 Additionally, the operations of establish-
ments affecting commerce in a manner sufficient to trigger the Act’s
protections were circumscribed.75 These requirements potentially
excluded certain types of establishments that held themselves out to
the public but were more “intimate and personal” in the services that
they provided.76
In contrast to the long history of the federal and state govern-
ments and the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to race discrimina-
tion in public accommodations, there is much less judicial experience
with sexual orientation. The U.S. Supreme Court has only decided two
cases addressing public accommodation statutes and sexual orienta-
tion in the thirty-seven years since the District of Columbia became
the first jurisdiction in the United States prohibiting discrimination
on this basis.77 In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination
or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”).
74. Id. § 2000a(b). This portion of the Civil Rights Act defined public accommodations
as:
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to
transient guests . . . ;
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or
other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the
premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the
premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station;
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium
or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and
(4) any establishment . . . which is physically located within the premises of
any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or . . . within
the premises of which is physically located any such covered estab-
lishment and . . . which holds itself out as serving patrons of such
covered establishment.
Id. § 2000a(b)(1)-(4).
75. Id. § 2000a(c). For example, a food service establishment was within the scope of the
Act only if it served or offered to serve “interstate travelers of a substantial portion of the
food which it serves, or gasoline or other products which it sells, has moved in commerce.”
Id. § 2000a(c)(2). A place offering exhibitions and entertainment was covered only if it
“customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or other sources
of entertainment which move in commerce.” Id. § 2000a(c)(3). “Commerce” was defined as
“travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the . . . states,”
the states and the District of Columbia or among the states, the District of Columbia and
a foreign country, territory or possession. Id. § 2000a(c)(4).
76. Id. § 2000a(b). For example, establishments providing lodging to transient guests
with five or fewer rooms for hire and in which the proprietor occupied as his residence
were excluded from coverage. Id. § 2000a(b)(1); see also Muehlmeyer, supra note 66, at
789–90 (characterizing this exception as “reflecting a policy that the nature of some
establishments—like bed and breakfasts—are more ‘intimate and personal’ and should
therefore fall outside the scope of the statute in order to respect the privacy of home-like
establishments”).
77. See D.C. CODE § 2-1402.31(a)(1) (2014). For a history of sexual orientation as a
protected class under state and local public accommodation laws, see Kelly Catherine
Chapman, Note, Gay Rights, the Bible, and Public Accommodations: An Empirical
Approach to Religious Exemptions for Holdout States, 100 GEO. L.J. 1783, 1789 (2012).
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Group of Boston, the Court held that the application of Massachu-
setts’s statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation to the annual St. Patrick’s Day-Evacuation Parade compelled
speech by the parade’s sponsors in contravention of the First Amend-
ment.78 Five years later, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court
reached a similar conclusion with respect to associational rights in the
context of the application of New Jersey’s statute to membership in
the Boy Scouts.79 The results in Hurley and Dale have been described
as standing for the proposition that an organization “may not be forced
to communicate a particular message [through the application of pub-
lic accommodation statutes], even when the organization does not
exist principally for the purpose of communicating its views on the
topic.” 80 However, the Court has yet to consider whether the applica-
tion of a public accommodation statute prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation conflicts with the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment.
State legislative efforts to expand protections afforded by public
accommodation statutes have increased significantly in more recent
times. Current statutes have greatly expanded the number of covered
business activities beyond nineteenth century definitions.81 The num-
ber of protected classes has also grown beyond race.82 This expanded
78. 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995). The Court found the parade to be an expressive activity
worthy of First Amendment protection. Id. at 567. The lower courts’ order declaring the
parade to be a public accommodation and thereby permitting the Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston to participate compelled the parade organizers to
affirm beliefs with which they disagreed and make statements they would rather avoid
in violation of the compelled speech doctrine. Id. at 573. For discussion of the compelled
speech doctrine, see Lucien J. Dhooge, The First Amendment and Disclosure Regulations:
Compelled Speech or Corporate Opportunism?, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 599, 608–12 (2014).
79. 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000). The Court held that application of New Jersey’s public
accommodation law to compel admission to membership in a private organization such
as the Boy Scouts would “interfere with [its] choice not to propound a point of view contrary
to its beliefs,” specifically that homosexual conduct was inconsistent with its values and
rules. Id. at 654.
80. Gottry, supra note 64, at 976.
81. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.5(a) (West 2014) (stating that “[n]o business estab-
lishment of any kind whatsoever shall discriminate against, boycott or blacklist, or refuse
to buy from, contract with, sell to, or trade with any person . . . on account of any charac-
teristic listed” in the statute, any perception regarding such characteristic or because the
person is associated with a person possessing or believed to possess such characteristic);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4502(14) (West 2014) (defining a “place of public accommodation”
as “any establishment which caters to or offers goods or services or facilities to, or solicits
patronage from, the general public”); see also Gottry, supra note 64, at 967 (“Current
state public accommodation laws have cast off their historical roots and embrace a wide
range of business activity.”).
82. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West 2014) (prohibiting discrimination based
upon “sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, ge-
netic information, marital status, or sexual orientation”); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-
102(A) (West 2014) (prohibiting discrimination based upon “race, color, religion, sex,
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class includes sexual orientation in twenty-one states and the District
of Columbia.83 The next section of this Article compares and con-
trasts the public accommodation statutes that include sexual orien-
tation within their protections.
B. A Comparative Analysis of State Public Accommodation
Statutes and Sexual Orientation
State statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation are not uniform. Nevertheless, the stated legislative
purposes of these statutes are similar. Five of these statutes may be
described as proscriptive through specific reference to the elimina-
tion of discrimination as their primary purpose.84 These statutes
differ in their general description of the prohibition upon discrimi-
nation, but these differences are more stylistic than substantive.85
Four of these statutes, plus an additional thirteen statutes, are
affirmative in nature by granting to protected classes free, full and
equal access to public accommodations.86 These statutes differ in
their description of this access, but once again, such differences are
national origin, ancestry, age, order of protection status, marital status, physical or mental
disability, military status, sexual orientation, or unfavorable discharge from military
service”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.030(1) (West 2014) (prohibiting discrimination
based upon “race, creed, color, national origin, sex, honorably discharged veteran or mili-
tary status, sexual orientation, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability
or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability”); see also
Gottry, supra note 64, at 967–68 (discussing the expansion of protected classes under
current state public accommodation statutes).
83. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
84. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4501 (West 2014); D.C. CODE § 2-1401.01 (2014); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 489-3 (West 2014); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-304 (West 2014); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 290(3) (McKinney 2014).
85. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4501 (West 2014) (prevention of discrimination); D.C.
CODE § 2-1401.01 (2014) (“secur[ing] an end . . . to discrimination for any reason other than
that of individual merit”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-3 (West 2014) (prohibiting “[u]nfair dis-
criminatory practices” with respect public accommodations); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T
§ 20-304 (West 2014) (prohibiting the refusal, withholding from or denial “to any person
any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of the place of public accom-
modation”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290(3) (McKinney 2014) (prevention of discrimination).
86. See CAL. CIV. CODE §5(b) (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601(2) (West
2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81d(a) (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4503
(West 2014); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.01 (2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-3 (West 2014); 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102(A), 5/5-102(A) (West 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.7 (West 2014);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4591 (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (West
2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363A.02(1)(a), 363A.11(1)(a) (West 2014); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 233.010(2), 651.070 (West 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:16 (West 2014);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2014); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291(2) (McKinney 2014); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 659A.403(1) (2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(1)(b)(West 2014);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 106.52(3) (West 2014).
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most likely stylistic rather than substantive.87 Fifteen of these statutes
expressly or implicitly describe full and equal access to public accom-
modations as a fundamental civil right.88 However, only six of these
statutes contain explicit legislative findings within their provisions
as to the necessity of guaranteeing equal access to public accommo-
dations and the pernicious impact of discrimination.89
87. See CAL. CIV. CODE §51(b) (West 2014) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of this
state are free and equal . . . .”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601(2) (West 2014) (“full
and equal enjoyment”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81d(a) (West 2014) (“full and equal
accommodations”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4503 (West 2014) (“full and equal accommo-
dations”); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.01 (2014) (granting individuals “an equal opportunity to
participate fully in . . . economic, cultural and intellectual life . . . and to have an equal op-
portunity to participate in all aspects of life . . . .”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-3 (West 2014)
(“full and equal enjoyment”); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102(A), 5/5-102(A) (West 2014)
(granting individuals “freedom from discrimination” and “full and equal enjoyment” of pub-
lic accommodations); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4591, 4592(1) (2014) (“equal access”
and “full and equal enjoyment”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (West 2014) (“full and
equal accommodations”); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363A.02(1)(a), 363A.11(1)(a) (West 2014)
(securing for persons “freedom from discrimination” and “full and equal enjoyment of public
accommodations”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 233.010(2), 651.070 (West 2014)(granting
persons “full and equal enjoyment” of public accommodations “without discrimination”);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:16 (2014) (granting individuals “equal access” to public accom-
modations “without discrimination”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2014) (stating that
persons may “obtain” public accommodations “without discrimination”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 291(2) (McKinney 2014) (granting individuals “[e]quality of opportunity” with respect
to public accommodations “without discrimination”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.403(1)
(West 2014) (granting persons “full and equal accommodations . . . without . . . discrimi-
nation”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(1)(b) (West 2014) (“full enjoyment”).
88. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(a) (West 2014) (by title of the statute as the “Unruh Civil
Rights Act”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81d(a) (West 2014) (by inclusion of the law
in the human rights chapter of the state’s statutes); D.C. CODE § 2-1401.01 (2014) (by
title of the legislation as the “Human Rights Law”); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102
(West 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.7 (West 2014) (by inclusion of the law in the social
justice and human rights subtitles of the state’s statutes); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4591
(2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (West 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.02(2)
(West 2014); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 233.010 (West 2014) (by inclusion of the law in the
chapter relating to the Nevada Equal Rights Commission); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:16
(2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 2014) (by inclusion of the law in the civil rights title
of the state’s statutes); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2 (West 2014) (by title of the statute as
the “Human Rights Act”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290(1) (by title of the statute as the “Human
Rights Law”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.006(2) (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.030(1) (West 2014). Other states include public accommodation provisions within
statutory sections relating to government, commerce, or criminal offenses. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601 (West 2014) (included in the title relating to the
Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 4501–4504 (West
2014) (included in the title relating to commerce and trade); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 489-2
to -5 (West 2014) (included in the title relating to trade regulation and practice); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ ANN. 11-24-2 to -2.1 (West 2014) (included in the title relating to criminal
offenses); VT. STAT. ANN tit. 9, § 4502 (West 2014) (included in the title relating to com-
merce and trade); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 106.52 (West 2014) (included in the title relating to
industrial regulation).
89. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.02(1)(b) (West 2014) (“Such discrimination threatens
the rights and privileges of the inhabitants of this state and menaces the institutions and
foundations of democracy.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 233.010(2) (West 2014) (declaring that
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There is less uniformity among the statutes upon consideration
of their substantive provisions. The first notable difference occurs in
the definition of public accommodations. Although the California stat-
ute does not use the term “public accommodations,” it is clearly appli-
cable to a very broad range of for-profit and non-profit organizations
that promote the business or economic interests of their members.90
The remaining statutes contain specific definitions of “public accom-
modations.” However, these definitions are different and may classi-
fied in two categories. Ten states define “public accommodations” very
broadly to include any establishment offering goods or services to
the public.91 The remaining statutes have lengthy but very general
equal access is necessary to “protect the welfare, prosperity, health and peace of all [state
residents]”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 2014) (stating that “discrimination threatens
not only the rights and proper privileges of the inhabitants of the State but menaces the
institutions and foundation of a free democratic State” and equal access is required in
order to ensure “economic prosperity and general welfare” and prevent personal hard-
ships, economic loss, physical and emotional stress, uncertainties and personal and pro-
fessional disruptions associated with unlawful discrimination); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290(3)
(McKinney 2014) (stating that discrimination “not only threatens the rights and proper
privileges of . . . inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free demo-
cratic state and threatens the peace, order, health, safety and general welfare of the state
and its inhabitants”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 659A.003, 659A.006 (West 2014) (stating that
equal access is required in order to “ensure the human dignity of all people within this
state and protect their health, safety and morals from the consequences of intergroup
hostility, tensions and practices of unlawful discrimination” and that such discrimination
“not only threatens the rights and privileges of . . . inhabitants but menaces the insti-
tutions and foundation of a free democratic state”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010
(West 2014) (finding that “discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privi-
leges of [the state’s] inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free
democratic state”).
90. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.59(a) (West 2014) (“No business establishment of any
kind whatsoever shall discriminate against, boycott or blacklist, or refuse to buy from, con-
tract with, sell to, or trade with any person . . . on account of any characteristic listed
[herein].”). According to the California Supreme Court, the term “business establishments”
must be interpreted “in the broadest sense reasonably possible.” Curran v. Mt. Diablo
Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 236 (Cal. 1998) (citation omitted). The
term has been applied to for-profit commercial enterprises and non-profit organizations
with an underlying business or economic purpose. See, e.g., Stevens v. Optimum Health
Inst., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1088–89 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (religious organization); O’Connor
v. Village Green Owners Ass’n, 662 P.2d 427, 431 (Cal. 1983) (condominium association);
Rotary Club of Duarte v. Bd. of Dir., 224 Cal. Rptr. 213, 221–26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (non-
profit civic association). But see Curran, 952 P.2d at 236 (holding that charitable
organizations whose activities are not related to business or economic purposes are not
business establishments within the meaning of the public accommodation statute). Addi-
tionally, the Disabled Persons Act utilizes the term “public accommodation” with an accom-
panying list of locations. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 54.1(a)(1) (West 2014). California courts
have concluded that the term “public accommodation” in this statute is closely related
to the term “business establishment” and that the two terms should be analyzed together.
See Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, L.L.C., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 144, 154 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2008).
91. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-63(1) (West 2014) (“any establishment which
caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public”); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 4502(14) (West 2014) (“any establishment which caters to or offers goods or
2015] PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION STATUTES 339
lists of establishments considered to be “public accommodations.” 92
services or facilities to, or solicits patronage from, the general public”); D.C. CODE § 2-
1401.02(24) (2014) (all places offering lodging to transient guests, establishments serving
food or beverages, places of exhibition, amusement and recreation, retail establishments
offering goods, services and recreation to the public, and transportation facilities); 775
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-101(A)(1)-(13) (West 2014) (all places offering lodging to tran-
sient guests, establishments serving food or beverages, places of exhibition, amusement
and recreation, retail establishments offering goods, services and recreation to the public,
transportation facilities, and non-sectarian educational institutions at any level); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 216.2(13)(a) (West 2014) (“each and every place, establishment, or facility
of whatever kind, nature, or class that caters or offers services, facilities, or goods for a
fee or charge to nonmembers of any organization or association utilizing the place, estab-
lishment, or facility” and all such places, establishments, or facilities that offer services,
facilities, or goods gratuitously if they receive governmental support or a subsidy); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 363A.03(34) (West 2014) (“a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertain-
ment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind . . . whose goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages or accommodation are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made
available to the public”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(H) (West 2014) (“any establishment that
provides or offers its services, facilities, accommodations or goods to the public”); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.400(1) (West 2014) (“Any place or service offering to the public
accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges whether in the nature of goods, ser-
vices, lodgings, amusements . . . or otherwise.”); VT. STAT. ANN tit. 9, § 4501(1) (West 2014)
(“any school, restaurant, store, establishment or other facility at which services, facilities,
goods, privileges, advantages, benefits or accommodations are offered to the general
public”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 106.52(1)(e)(1) (West 2014) (“any place where accommoda-
tions, amusement, goods, or services are available either free or for a consideration”).
92. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601(1) (West 2014) (“any place of business en-
gaged in any sales to the public and any place offering services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages, or accommodations to the public” followed by a list of thirty-eight specific types of
establishments); HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-2(1)-(12) (West 2014) (“a business, accommodation,
refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind whose goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations are extended, offered, sold,
or otherwise made available to the public as customers, clients, or visitors” followed by a
list of twelve specific types of establishments); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(8)(A)-(N)
(2014) (“a facility, operated by a public or private entity, whose operations fall within at
least one of the following [fourteen] categories”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A
(West 2014) (“any place . . . which is open to and accepts or solicits the patronage of the
general public” followed by a list of ten specific types of establishments); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 651.050(3)(a)-(o) (West 2014) (an “establishment or place to which the public is
invited or which is intended for public use” followed by a list of fourteen specific types
of establishments); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:2(XIV) (2014) (an “establishment which
caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public” with twenty specific
examples of such establishments); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l) (West 2014) (all places offer-
ing lodging to transient guests, establishments serving food or beverages, places of exhibi-
tion, amusement and recreation, producers, manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors and
retailers offering goods, services and recreation to the public, transportation facilities, and
educational institutions at any level followed by a list of twenty-nine specific types of estab-
lishments); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292 (McKinney 2014) (all places offering lodging to transient
guests, establishments serving food or beverages, places of exhibition, amusement and rec-
reation, wholesalers and retailers offering goods, services and recreation to the public, and
transportation facilities followed by a list of fifty-one types of establishments but spe-
cifically excluding public educational institutions); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-24-3(1-9) (West
2014) (listing forty-seven separate locations as “[p]laces of public accommodation”); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040(2) (West 2014) (“any place, licensed or unlicensed, kept for
gain, hire, or reward, or where charges are made for admission, service, occupancy, or use
of any property or facilities” followed by a list of twenty-three types of locations).
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Although diverse in their specific listings, the definitions in these
statutes primarily focus on lodging of transient guests, establishments
serving food and beverages, places of exhibition, amusement and rec-
reation, retail establishments offering goods, services and recreation
to the public, and transportation facilities.93
By contrast, the sections of these statutes identifying protected
classes are relatively uniform. All of these statutes, with the possible
exception of Minnesota, include heterosexuality, homosexuality and
bisexuality within the term “sexual orientation.” 94 These statutes,
with the possible exceptions of Delaware and Vermont, also extend
the definition to include perceived orientation of persons by others.95
93. Maryland’s statute encapsulates these general areas of coverage through its applica-
tion to lodging of transient guests, facilities principally engaged in the sale of food or alco-
holic beverages, all places of exhibition or entertainment and retail establishments offering
goods, services, entertainment, recreation or transportation to the public without further
detailed lists of facilities or businesses. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-301 (West
2014); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:2(XIV) (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-24-
3(1)-(9) (West 2014).
94. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §12,926(s) (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-301(7)
(West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81a (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 4502(16) (West 2014); D.C. CODE § 2-1401.02(28) (2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-2(12)
(2014); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103(O-1) (West 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.2(14)
(West 2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(9-C) (2014); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T
§ 20-101(f) (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151, § 3(6) (West 2014); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §651.050(4) (West 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21:49 (2014) ; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-5(hh)-(kk) (West 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(P) (West 2014); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 292(27) (McKinney 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.100 (West 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 11-24-2.1(h) (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN tit. 1, § 143 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.040(26) (West 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(13m) (West 2014). The New
York statute includes asexuality within the definition of “sexual orientation.” See N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 292(27) (McKinney 2014). The Minnesota statute does not use the terms “het-
erosexuality,” “homosexuality” or “bisexuality” but rather defines “sexual orientation” as:
having or being perceived as having an emotional, physical, or sexual attach-
ment to another person without regard to the sex of that person or having
or being perceived as having an orientation for such attachment, or having
or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally asso-
ciated with one’s biological maleness or femaleness.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03(44) (West 2014). This definition presumably includes hetero-
sexuality despite the absence of a specific reference.
95. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.5(a) (West 2014) (perceived orientation); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 24-34-301(7) (West 2014) (perceived orientation); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81a
(West 2014) (identification with a specific sexual orientation); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.31(a)
(2014) (included within the prohibitions section rather than the definitional section);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-2(12) (West 2014) (identification with a specific sexual orientation);
775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103(O-1) (West 2014) (perceived orientation); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 216.2(14) (West 2014) (perceived orientation); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(9-C)
(2014) (perceived orientation); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-101(f) (West 2014)
(identification with one or more sexual orientations); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B,
§ 3(6) (West 2014) (identification with a specific sexual orientation); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 363A.03(44) (West 2014) (perceived orientation); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §  651.050(4) (West
2014) (perceived orientation); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21:49 (2014) (perceived orientation);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(hh) (West 2014) (perceived, presumed or identified orientation);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(P) (West 2014) (perceived orientation); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(27)
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However, only eighteen of these statutes expressly include gender
identity or expression.96 The definitions of gender identity and ex-
pression vary slightly among those statutes extending protection to
this group.97
(McKinney 2014) (perceived orientation); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.100(6) (West 2014)
(perceived orientation); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-24-2.1(h) (West 2014) (perceived
orientation); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040(26) (West 2014) (perceived orientation);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(13m) (West 2014) (identification with a specific sexual orienta-
tion). The Delaware statute makes no reference to perceived or identified sexual orientation
but does state that it “shall be liberally construed to the end that the rights herein provided
for all people, without regard to . . . sexual orientation . . . may be effectively safeguarded.”
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4501 (West 2014). It may be concluded from this language that
discrimination on the basis of perceived or identified sexual orientation would be pro-
hibited. Vermont’s statute does not distinguish between actual and perceived orientation.
See VT. STAT. ANN tit. 1, § 143 (West 2014). The questionnaire utilized by the Civil Rights
Unit of the Vermont Attorney General’s Office allows for aggrieved persons to file a com-
plaint with respect to perceived orientation, but the Vermont Human Rights Commission
does not make this distinction in the complaint form utilized in employment discrimination
cases. See Anti-Discrimination Law in Vermont, GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS
(2014), http://www.glad.org/rights/vermont/c/anti-discrimination-law-in-vermont, archived
at http://perma.cc/V5L6-RE72.
96. See CAL. CIV. CODE §51.5(a) (West 2014) (actual or perceived gender identity and
expression); COLO. REV. STAT. § 2-4-401(13.5) (West 2014) (gender identity); CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 46a-64a (West 2014) (gender identity); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4503 (gender
identity); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.31(a) (2014) (actual or perceived gender identity or expres-
sion); HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-3 (West 2014) (gender identity or expression); 775 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/5-102(A) (West 2014) (actual or perceived gender-related identity); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 216.7(1)(a) (West 2014) (gender identity); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T §
20-101(f) (gender identity); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(9-C) (2014) (actual or per-
ceived gender identity or expression); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.11(1)(a) (West 2014)
(actual or perceived gender identity); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651.070 (West 2014) (gender
identity or expression); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2014) (actual or perceived gender
identity and expression); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (West 2014) (gender identity); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.403 (West 2014) (actual or perceived gender identity); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. §§ 11-24-2, 2.3 (West 2014) (actual or perceived gender identity or expression);
VT. STAT. ANN tit. 9, § 4502(a) (West 2014) (gender identity); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.215(1) (West 2014) (actual or perceived gender identity and expression).
97. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(e)(5) (West 2014) (“a person’s gender-related appearance
and behavior whether or not stereotypically associated with the person’s assigned sex at
birth”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-51(21) (West 2014) (“gender-related identity,
appearance or behavior, whether or not that gender-related identity, appearance or
behavior is different from that traditionally associated with the person’s physiology or
assigned sex at birth” as long as such identity or expression is “sincerely held, part of a per-
son’s core identity” as demonstrated by evidence such as “consistent and uniform asser-
tion[s]” and not for an “improper purpose”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4502(10) (West 2014)
(“gender-related identity, appearance, expression or behavior of a person, regardless of
the person’s assigned sex at birth” as long as such identity is “sincerely held as part of a
person’s core identity” as demonstrated by evidence such as “consistent and uniform asser-
tion[s]” and not for an “improper purpose”); D.C. CODE § 2-1401.02(12A) (2014) (“gender-
related identity, appearance, expression, or behavior of an individual, regardless of the
individual’s assigned sex at birth”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-2 (West 2014) (“actual or per-
ceived gender, as well as a person’s gender identity, gender-related self-image, gender-
related appearance, or gender-related expression regardless of whether [they are] . . .
different from that traditionally associated with the person’s sex at birth”); 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103(O-1) (West 2014) (an identity “not traditionally associated with
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The majority of the statutes also prohibit acts related to unlaw-
ful discrimination. Thirteen statutes prohibit the publication, posting,
circulation or other dissemination of written or electronic communi-
cations that the patronage of persons will be refused or denied or that
persons are unwelcome, objectionable, or undesirable due to their
sexual orientation or gender identity.98 Thirteen statutes prohibit
the person’s designated sex at birth”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.2(10) (West 2014) (the
“identity of a person, regardless of the person’s assigned sex at birth”); 94-348 ME. HUM.
RIGHTS COMM’N REG. CH. 3, § 3.02(C)(2)-(3) (2014) (defining “gender identity” as an “indi-
vidual’s gender-related identity, whether or not that identity is different from that
traditionally associated with that individual’s assigned sex at birth, including, but not
limited to, a gender identity that is transgender or androgynous” and defining “gender ex-
pression” as “the manner which [one’s] gender identity is expressed, including, . . . through
dress, appearance, manner, speech, or lifestyle”); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-
101(e)(1)-(2) (West 2014) (“identity, appearance, expression, or behavior . . . regardless
of the person’s assigned sex at birth, which may be demonstrated by . . . consistent and
uniform assertion of the person’s gender identity . . . or . . . any other evidence that the
gender identity is sincerely held as part of the person’s core identity”); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 363A.03(44) (West 2014) (including actual or perceived “self-image or identity not
traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness or femaleness” within the definition
of the term “sexual orientation”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651.050(2) (West 2014) (“a
gender-related identity, appearance, expression or behavior of a person, regardless of the
person’s assigned sex at birth”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(rr) (West 2014) (“having or being
perceived as having a gender related identity or expression whether or not stereo-
typically associated with a person’s assigned sex at birth”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(Q)
(West 2014) (“a person’s self-perception, or perception of that person by another, of the
person’s identity as a male or female based upon the person’s appearance, behavior or phys-
ical characteristics that are in accord with or opposed to the person’s physical anatomy,
chromosomal sex or sex at birth”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.100(6) (West 2014) (“gender
identity, appearance, expression or behavior [regardless of whether it] differs from that
traditionally associated with the individual’s sex at birth”); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-24-
2.1(I) (West 2014) (“actual or perceived gender, as well as a person’s gender identity,
gender-related self-image, gender-related appearance, or gender-related expression [regard-
less of] whether [they are] . . . different from that traditionally associated with the
person’s sex at birth”); VT. STAT. ANN tit. 1, § 144 (West 2014) (“an individual’s actual
or perceived gender identity, or gender-related characteristics intrinsically related to an
individual’s gender or gender-identity, regardless of the individual’s assigned sex at
birth”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040(26) (West 2014) (“gender identity, self-image,
appearance, behavior, or expression, whether or not . . . [they are] different from that
traditionally associated with the sex assigned to that person at birth”). The Colorado
statute utilizes “transgender” rather than “gender identity” but does not define the term.
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-301(7) (West 2014).
98. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601(2) (West 2014) (“any written, electronic, or
printed communication, notice, or advertisement”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4504(b) (West
2014) (“any written, typewritten, mimeographed, printed or radio communications”); D.C.
CODE § 2-1402.31(a)(2) (2014) (“a statement, advertisement, or sign”); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/5-102(B) (West 2014) (“any written communication, except a private communication
sent in response to a specific inquiry”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.7(1)(b) (2014) (applying to
all publicity including advertising); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4592(2) (2014) (“any notice
or advertisement”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West 2014) (“any advertise-
ment, circular, folder, book, pamphlet, written or painted or printed notice or sign”);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:17 (2014) (“any written or printed communication, notice
or advertisement”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2)(a) (McKinney 2014) (“any written or printed
communication, notice or advertisement”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.409 (West 2014)
(“any communication, notice, advertisement or sign of any kind”); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
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aiding, abetting, inducing or indirectly assisting in unlawful discrimi-
natory acts.99 California and Minnesota also prohibit discrimination
against third persons on the basis of their association with others
having or perceived to have a specific sexual orientation, gender iden-
tity or expression.100
Several of these statutes exclude specific accommodations, activi-
ties or organizations from their coverage.101 The most significant
§ 11-24-2 (West 2014) (“any written, printed or painted communication, notice, or advertise-
ment”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 106.52(3)(a)(3) (West 2014) (“any written communication”).
99. See CAL. CIV. CODE §52(a) (West 2014) (aiding and inciting discriminatory prac-
tices); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601(2) (West 2014) (indirect participation in unlawful
discriminatory practices); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4504(a), (c) (West 2014) (indirect par-
ticipation in unlawful discriminatory practices or assisting, inducing, inciting or coercing
another person to engage in such practices); D.C. CODE §§ 2-1402.31(a)(1), 2-1402.61(a),
2-1402.62 (2014) (indirect participation in unlawful discriminatory practices, denying equal
access to public accommodations through coercion, threats, or retaliation, and aiding and
abetting unlawful discriminatory practices); HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-5(a)(2) (West 2014)
(conspiracies “to aid, abet, incite, or coerce a person to engage in a discriminatory prac-
tice”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4553(10)(D), 4592(1) (2014) (aiding, abetting,
inciting, compelling or coercing unlawful discriminatory practices and indirect participation
in such practices); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-801(1) (West 2014) (aiding, abetting,
inciting, compelling or coercing another person to engage in unlawful discriminatory prac-
tices); MASS. GEN. LAWS Ann. ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (West 2014) (indirect participation in
unlawful discriminatory practices and aiding or inciting such practices); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 354-A:2(XV)(d), 354-A:17 (West 2014) (aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling or
coercing another person to engage in unlawful discriminatory practices and indirect
participation in such practices); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-7(F), 28-1-7(I) (West 2014)
(indirect participation in unlawful discriminatory practices, aiding, abetting, inciting, com-
pelling or coercing such practices or willfully obstructing or preventing a person from
complying with the public accommodation statute); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2)(a)
(McKinney 2014) (indirect participation in unlawful discriminatory practices); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 659A.406 (West 2014) (aiding or abetting unlawful discriminatory prac-
tices); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-24-2 (West 2014) (indirect participation in unlawful dis-
criminatory practices); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.215(1), 220 (West 2014) (indirect
participation in unlawful discriminatory practices and aiding, abetting, encouraging or
inciting such practices).
100. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.5(a) (West 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.15(2) (West
2014).
101. These exclusions are in addition to conditions or limitations with respect to access
to public accommodations that are equally applicable to all persons regardless of their
status or otherwise conform to usual and regular business practices. See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
CODE § 51(c) (West 2014) (exclusion for non-discriminatory requirements and standards
applicable to all persons); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601(3) (West 2014) (allowing
for distinctions based upon gender “if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such places of public
accommodation”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81d(a) (West 2014) (exclusion for
“conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons”); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4504(a) (West 2014) (allowing for distinctions based upon gender
identity or expression in “areas of facilities where disrobing is likely”); 775 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/5-102.1(a) (West 2014) (exclusion for health care professionals and private
service providers if such denial of accommodation is based upon a non-discriminatory
reason equally applicable to all persons regardless of status); MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GOV’T § 20-302 (West 2014) (exclusion for non-discriminatory conformance to “the usual
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exclusion for purposes of this Article relates to religious organiza-
tions, facilities, and activities. Religion-based exclusions vary consid-
erably among the states. For example, Connecticut, Maine and New
Jersey limit their exclusions to specific areas of law that do not include
public accommodations such as education, employment and housing.102
The legality of any exclusion granted for religious purposes in Cali-
fornia is to be determined by application of the standards set forth in
Employment Division v. Smith.103 By contrast, several states exempt
religious organizations from their public accommodation statutes
although the specific requirements to obtain an exclusion are differ-
ent.104 For example, Colorado’s statute specifically excludes churches,
and regular requirements, standards, and regulations of the establishment” that are
equally applicable to all persons); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (West 2014) (exclu-
sion for non-discriminatory “conditions and limitations established by law and applicable
to all persons”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2014) (exclusion for non-discriminatory
“conditions and limitations applicable alike to all persons”); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-24-1
(West 2014) (conditioning equal access to public accommodations upon “conditions and
limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons”); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.215 (West 2014) (providing exclusion for non-discriminatory “conditions and
limitations established by law and applicable to all persons”).
102. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-81p, 81aa (West 2014) (exempting religious
corporations, entities, associations, educational institutions or societies with respect to em-
ployment distinctions based upon sexual orientation and gender identity relating to the
carrying out of its activities or with respect to “matters of discipline, faith, internal organi-
zation or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(10)(G)(1)-
(3) (2014) (permitting religious corporations, associations, and organizations that do not
receive public funds to make distinctions based upon sexual orientation with respect to
employment, housing, and educational opportunity); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l) (West 2014)
(exempting “any educational facility operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or
sectarian institution”).
103. See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp. v. San Diego Cnty. Superior Court, 189 P.3d
959, 966, 968 (Cal. 2008) (concluding that the Unruh Civil Rights Act was “a valid and
neutral law of general applicability,” that “[t]he Act further[ed] California’s compelling
interest in ensuring full and equal access to medical treatment irrespective of sexual
orientation, and that there [were] no less restrictive means for the state to achieve that
goal” (citing Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)).
104. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 2-1401.03(b) (2014) (allowing a religious organization to
limit admission and “give[] preference[s] to persons of the same religion as is calculated
by the organization to promote the religious . . . principles for which it is established or
maintained”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.7(2)(a) (West 2014) (exempting a “bona fide religious
institution with respect to any qualifications the institution may impose based on religion,
sexual orientation, or gender identity when such qualifications are related to a bona fide
religious purpose”); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-202(3)(c) (West 2014) (allowing a
“religious organization, association or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization
operated, supervised, or controlled by a religious organization, association, or society” to
limit admission or give preferences to individuals of the same religion or domination);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.26(1-2) (West 2014) (allowing religious associations, corporations,
and societies that are not organized for private profit and affiliated nonprofit institutions
organized for educational purposes to limit admission and give preference to persons of
the same religion or denomination and, “in matters relating to sexual orientation, tak[e]
any action with respect to education, employment, housing and real property, or use of
facilities” as long as such activities were not secular in nature and were related to the
religious or educational purposes of the organization); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3540A:18
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synagogues, mosques and other places principally used for religious
purposes.105 Illinois’s statute exempts “the exercise of free speech,
free expression, free exercise of religion or expression of religiously
based views by any individual or group of individuals” in any place of
public accommodation.106 The majority of jurisdictions that have
recognized same sex marriage rights legislatively have included an
exemption for religious organizations, although these exemptions vary
in language and coverage.107
(West 2014) (permitting “any religious or denominational institution or organization, or any
organization operated for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, super-
vised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization” to limit admission in
order to “promote the religious principles for which it is established or maintained”); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 28-1-9(B) (West 2014) (permitting a “religious or denominational institution”
to limit admission or give preferences to persons of the same religion and select buyers
“as are calculated by the organization or denomination to promote the religious or denomi-
national principles for which it is established . . . unless membership . . . is restricted on
account of race, color, national origin or ancestry”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(11) (McKinney
2014) (permitting a “religious or denominational institution or organization, or any orga-
nization operated for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised
or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization” to give preferences to
persons of the same religion and take “such action as is calculated by such organization
to promote the religious principles for which it is established or maintained”); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 659A.006(3) (West 2014) (allowing “a bona fide church or other religious
institution” to restrict the use of facilities based upon “a bona fide religious belief about
sexual orientation as long as . . . use of the facilities is closely connected with or related to
the primary purposes of the church or institution and is not connected with a commercial
or business activity that has no necessary relationship to the church or institution”).
105. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601(1) (West 2014).
106. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-102.1(b) (West 2014).
107. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-22b, 35a (West 2014) (exempting churches and
church-controlled organizations from participation in ceremonies solemnizing marriages
in violation of their religious beliefs); D.C. CODE § 46-406(e)(1)-(2) (2014) (exempting
religious societies and affiliated nonprofit organizations from being required to provide
goods, services, accommodations and facilities relating to the solemnization or celebration
of marriages that are in violation of their beliefs and immunizing such refusals from
serving as a basis for civil liability); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-12.2(a)-(b) (West 2014) (exempt-
ing religious organizations and affiliated nonprofit associations from being required to
provide goods, services, and facilities relating to the solemnization or celebration of
marriages that are in violation of their beliefs or faith and immunizing such refusals
from serving as a basis for civil liability); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/209(a-10) (West
2014) (exempting organizations whose principal purpose is “the study, practice, or advance-
ment of religion” from being “required to provide religious facilities” (but not businesses,
health care and educational facilities or social service agencies) for the solemnization or
celebration of marriages that are in violation of their beliefs and immunizing such refusals
from serving as a basis for civil liability); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 655(3) (2014)
(exempting churches, religious denominations, and religious organizations from being
required to host any marriage in violation of their beliefs and immunizing such refusals
from serving as a basis for civil liability); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-202(3)(a)-(b) (West
2014) (exempting religious organizations, associations and societies and affiliated non-
profit institutions from being required to provide goods, services, accommodations, facili-
ties, and advantages relating to the solemnization or celebration of marriages that are
in violation of their beliefs and immunizing such refusals from serving as a basis for civil
liability); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363A.26(3), 517.09(3)(a) (West 2014) (exempting religious
associations, corporations, and societies from being required to provide goods, services,
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III. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION STATUTES AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION:
SHOULD THERE BE A RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION FOR
SECULAR BUSINESSES?
A. Religious Liberty and Public Accommodations:
Two Preliminary Assumptions
1. The Presence of a Credible Threat to Religious Freedom
Any argument advocating the need for a religious exemption to
public accommodation statutes based upon objections to sexual orien-
tation is based upon two assumptions. The first assumption is that
there is a credible threat to religious liberty in the absence of such an
exemption. Proponents of exemptions contend that the expansion of
protected classes and places in public accommodation statutes “have
created an environment of potentially widespread First Amendment
violations.”108 This expansion has far exceeded the narrow historical
purpose of public accommodation law as expressed in its common
law origins, specifically, guaranteeing access to “quasi-public” services
accommodations, and facilities relating to the solemnization or celebration of marriages
that are in violation of their beliefs and immunizing such refusals from serving as a basis
for civil liability to the extent that any refusal does not constitute a secular business
activity); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §457:37(III) (2014) (exempting religious organizations,
associations and societies and affiliated nonprofit institutions from being required to
provide goods, services, accommodations, facilities, advantages or privileges relating to
the solemnization or celebration of marriages that are in violation of their beliefs and
immunizing such refusals from serving as a basis for civil liability); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
10-B(1-2) (McKinney 2014) (exempting religious corporations from public accommodation
laws with respect to the solemnization and celebration of marriages on the basis that their
activities are private and immunizing refusals to provide accommodations, advantages,
facilities or privileges from serving as a basis for civil liability); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-
3-6.1(c)(1-2) (West 2014) (exempting religious organizations, associations and societies,
and affiliated nonprofit institutions fraternal benefit and service organizations from being
required to provide goods, services, accommodations, facilities, advantages and privileges
relating to the solemnization or celebration of marriages that are in violation of their
beliefs and immunizing such refusals from serving as a basis for civil liability); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, § 4502(k)(I) (West 2014) (allowing religious organizations, associations and
societies to selectively provide services, accommodations and goods related to “the solemni-
zation of a marriage or celebration of a marriage”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010(5)-
(6), (7)(b) (West 2014) (exempting any entity “whose principal purpose is the study,
practice, or advancement of religion” from being required to provide accommodations
relating to the solemnization or celebration of a marriage and immunizing such entity
from civil claims or causes of action based upon any refusal to provide accommodation);
see also H.B. 438, 430th Gen. Assemb. § 3(a)-(b) (Md. 2012) (exempting religious organi-
zations, associations and societies and affiliated nonprofit institutions from being required
to provide goods, services, accommodations, facilities and advantages relating to the sol-
emnization or celebration of marriages that are in violation of their beliefs and immunizing
such refusals from serving as a basis for civil liability).
108. Susan Nabet, Note, For Sale: The Threat of State Public Accommodation Laws to
the First Amendment Rights of Artistic Businesses, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1515, 1515 (2012).
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such as inns, restaurants, and common carriers.109 As a result, modern
public accommodation laws present a real and immediate threat to
religious liberty through actual or threatened litigation. Litigation,
threatened or otherwise, and the time and costs associated therewith
will allegedly force religious individuals and institutions to compro-
mise their principles with respect to sexual orientation.110 From this
point of view, the achievement of greater societal acceptance of the
LGBT community as evidenced by the inclusion of sexual orientation
as a protected class in an increasing number of public accommoda-
tion statutes will have the effect of placing religious practices and
speech in the “societal closet.”111
These dire predictions overstate the threat to religious liberty.
The conclusion that the exercise of religion in the United States is
frequently and substantially suppressed or heavily burdened is un-
supported.112 Conflicts, to the extent they exist, are generally fact-
specific rather than broad-based attacks upon free exercise.113 The
existence of such conflicts in the realm of public accommodations may
be further minimized by the willingness of market participants, no
matter how devout in the practice of their faiths, to overlook personal
prejudices in their quest to maximize profits.114 This willingness is
further supported by evidence that firms employing discriminatory
practices rather than focusing purely on economic reasons in the
operation of their businesses will fare worse in the long term.115 Those
businesses choosing to turn their backs on diversity in the twenty-
first century marketplace risk profit, reputation and, possibly, their
109. Id. at 1516.
110. See Roger Severino, Or For Poorer?: How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious
Liberty, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 939, 979 (2007).
111. J. Brady Brammer, Comment, Religious Groups and the Gay Rights Movement:
Recognizing Common Ground, 2006 BYU L. REV. 995, 1004 (2006).
112. See Lupu, supra note 56, at 566. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article,
state religious freedom restoration acts granting broad-based exemptions have proven to
be an ineffective means by which to protect religious liberty. See Lund, supra note 17,
at 468, 479–80 (contending that such acts “simply have not translated into a dependable
source of protection for religious liberty at the state level” and that there is “reason to doubt
that state RFRAs provide meaningful protection for religious observance” given the almost
complete absence of litigated claims).
113. See Lupu, supra note 56, at 566.
114. See Chapman, supra note 77, at 1820–21 (“[M]arket participants that are focused
on the bottom line . . . may overlook their personal prejudices against employees, business
owners, and consumers if they can assist in maximizing profits.”); see also Andrew
Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination Protections for Gay People
Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 134 (2006) (“Antigay dis-
crimination is now sufficiently stigmatized that a business that openly discriminates is
likely to pay an economic price for doing so.”).
115. See Chapman, supra note 77, at 1821; see also KAUSHIK BASU, BEYOND THE INVIS-
IBLE HAND: GROUNDWORK FOR A NEW ECONOMICS 78 (2011).
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very existence.116 Such firms thus may choose not to avail themselves
of protections purportedly afforded by religious exemptions to the
extent discriminatory practices are inconsistent with the bottom
line.117 Furthermore, although they differ in wording, public accom-
modation statutes extending protection to the LGBT community were
drafted by legislators acutely aware of potential conflicts and thus
contain significant exemptions for religious organizations, facilities
and activities.118 The absence of widespread threats and restraints
upon free exercise and these exemptions have led some commenta-
tors to conclude that the true reason for seeking further exemptions
is an objection to the increased secularization of society rather than
the protection of religious liberty.119
2. The Free Exercise of Religion and Public Accommodations
A second assumption relates to the definition of free exercise in
the context of business activities in general and public accommo-
dations in particular. In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court
defined the “exercise of religion” as involving “not only belief and pro-
fession but [also] the performance of (or abstention from) physical
acts.”120 This definition was qualified by reference to unquestionably
religious acts such as attendance at worship services, the sacramental
use of bread and wine, proselytizing, and abstention from certain
foods and modes of transportation.121
The breadth of activities constituting free exercise was widened
by the Court’s opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. In find-
ing a free exercise right for secular for-profit corporations, the Court
116. See Chapman, supra note 77, at 1820–21.
117. See id. at 1822.
118. See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text; see also McCusker, supra note
32, at 396 (contending that “secular laws of general applicability,” such as public accom-
modation statutes, and religious practices will infrequently conflict because such laws
“were constructed with those religions as part of their lawmakers’ worldviews, whether
as their own religions or as religions shared by those around them”).
119. See, e.g., Mary Jean Dolan, The Constitutional Flaws in the New Illinois Religious
Freedom Restoration Act: Why RFRAs Don’t Work, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 153, 157 (2000)
(contending that religious freedom restoration acts were not enacted “to solve any actual,
recognized problem of discrimination or burden on religious conduct. . . . [but were
adopted] to institute a global protection of religiously motivated conduct whenever it
conflicts with government regulation.”); McCusker, supra note 32, at 398 (“[T]raditionally
religious individuals are more likely to find their religious practices in conflict with
facially neutral laws than they would have a century ago when traditional religious moral
notions were more widespread.”).
120. 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
121. Id. See also id. at 893 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (defining the exercise of religion as
including “ ‘[t]he practice and performance of rites and ceremonies, worship . . . the right
or permission to celebrate the observances (of a religion)’ and religious observances such
as acts of public and private worship, preaching, and prophesying” (quoting, in part, A NEW
ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 401–02 (James A.H. Murray ed. 1897))).
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restated its definition in Smith.122 However, the Court omitted Smith’s
qualifying language tying free exercise to unquestionably religious
acts. Instead, the Court concluded that the exercise of religion involved
“ ‘not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention
from) physical acts’ that are ‘engaged in for religious reasons.’ ”123 This
language removed any necessary connection between the act or ab-
stention and their association with religious observances set forth
in Smith. As a result, any act or abstention regardless of its connec-
tion to specific rituals or observances could constitute free exercise
as long as it was “engaged in for religious reasons.”124 Any doubt as
to this expansion was eliminated by the Court’s subsequent conclu-
sion that “[b]usiness practices that are compelled or limited by the
tenets of a religious doctrine fall comfortably within [the] definition
[of exercise of religion].”125
Such a broad definition may play havoc with unimpaired access
to public accommodations free from discrimination. Statutes that man-
date access to public accommodations clearly compel business prac-
tices or limit the ability of businesses to select which members of the
public to serve. Such statutes are subject to judicial challenge to the
extent that such compulsion or limitations are perceived to run afoul
of the religious beliefs of the business’s owners. For example, may
an inn offering lodging to the general public refuse to provide a room
to a same-sex couple whom the owner or manager perceives to be
homosexuals? May a “family friendly” establishment, such as a restau-
rant or an amusement park, deny service or admission to the same
couple? May a contractor refuse to build a house intended to be used
by the couple as a residence? May a taxi cab driver refuse to trans-
port a person he perceives to be a homosexual to a gay bar? The pos-
sibilities with respect to sexual orientation are limitless given the
broad definition of public accommodations.126
This equation of business practices with the exercise of religion is
in error. The commercial nature of business operations should distance
the religious beliefs of the business’s owners from any accommodation
required to be given by the law.127 This conclusion in the context of
122. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505, at *44–*45
(U.S. June 30, 2014).
123. Id. at *44 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 877).
124. Id. (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 877); see also supra note 62 and accompanying text
(discussing the disconnection of the definition of “religious exercise” in the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act from compulsion or centrality to a system of religious
belief and the breadth of its definition in state religious freedom restoration acts).
125. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505, at *44–*45.
126. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
127. See Alvin C. Lin, Note, Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Laws and the Reli-
gious Liberty Protection Act: The Pitfalls of the Compelling State Interest Inquiry, 89 GEO.
L.J. 719, 733 (2001) (contending that religious freedom cases arising in a commercial
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public accommodation statutes recognizes that such laws apply to
business operations which in and of themselves are not exercises of
religion.128 In so doing, public accommodation statutes cannot rea-
sonably be attacked as targeting religious-based activities.129
This conclusion recognizes a fundamental difference between
religious and secular organizations. As correctly noted by Justice
Ginsburg in her dissent in Hobby Lobby, secular for-profit corporations
do not “exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing to the same
religious faith” nor do they “exist to serve a community of believers.”130
To conclude otherwise creates a “new up-is-down world” in which
those opposed to equal accommodation are practicing their faith when
engaged in even the most routine commercial transactions. Such prac-
tices are not only harmful to those negatively impacted by their appli-
cation but also trivialize professions and acts of faith engaged in for
truly spiritual purposes by equating such acts with those engaged in
solely out of bigotry and transparently discriminatory motives.
The equation of commercial practices with free exercise also in-
vites sham claims seeking exemptions from public accommodation
statutes on questionable religious grounds.131 Any would-be discrimi-
nator could avoid compliance by re-characterizing their otherwise
routine commercial operations as religious expression. Courts con-
fronted with such claims would be hard-pressed to deny such claims
given the prohibition upon judicial inquiry into the sincerity of reli-
gious beliefs.132 Sincere or otherwise, such religious beliefs could
context should be treated differently “on the theory that the commercial nature of the
enterprise somehow distances the person’s religious convictions from the ultimate
activity being regulated. . . . [and] [q]ualitatively, that result seems right”).
128. See Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 68 (N.M. 2013) (holding
that the public accommodations provision of the New Mexico Human Rights Act applied
to business operations, and in particular, decisions not to offer services to protected classes
of persons which in and of themselves were not expressive).
129. See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008, at 11 (Colo. Office of
Admin. Cts. Dec. 6, 2013) (initial decision granting Complainants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment and denying Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment) (holding that the
refusal to sell a wedding cake to a same-sex couple violated the Colorado public accommo-
dation statute which was neutral, of general applicability and focused on preventing
discrimination in the marketplace rather than aimed at restricting religious practices).
130. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505, at *123, *126 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
131. See Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 41–43 (1994) (“The threat of
cumulative exemptions comes not only from other sincere religious objectors, but from
other persons who could feign the same objection to get the benefits of exemption.”).
132. See, e.g., Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990)
(“Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not pre-
sume to determine . . . the plausibility of a religious claim.”); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490
U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of par-
ticular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations
of those creeds.”); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
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become a means by which to avoid compliance with the law. The ensu-
ing results would most likely be subjective, unfair and non-uniform
across jurisdictions.
It has been contended that the scope of the sham claims prob-
lem is exaggerated.133 Such claims would be discouraged through a
combination of “common sense costs,” lack of seriousness of purpose,
the risk of ill will directed at those asserting such claims, and the ab-
sence of material advantages associated with the receipt of an ex-
emption.134 These “informal constraints” would serve to “discourage
all but the most foolhardy from even broaching the subject.”135 Per-
haps this is so. Nevertheless, subjecting compliance with public ac-
commodation statutes to the perceived ability of businesses and
individuals to exercise self-control is not an enforcement strategy
that inspires confidence. Even those concluding that the problem
may be overstated have noted that the possibility of sham claims
cannot be “completely prevented . . . [or] entirely discounted.”136
Such claims are for the courts to determine, but their ability to do
so is circumscribed by restrictions upon inquiries into the sincerity
and validity of religious beliefs.137
In any event, public accommodation statutes are potentially regu-
lating conduct based upon religious beliefs rather than the beliefs
themselves. The distinction is real and substantial. All individuals and
businesses have an unlimited right to believe that which they
choose free from government interference and intervention.138 On
the other hand, conduct, whether religiously motivated or otherwise,
is subject to regulation for public safety and welfare reasons.139 This
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969). But see supra note 61 and accompanying
text (discussing the requirement of sincerely held religious tenets or beliefs in the Kansas
and Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Acts).
133. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 55, 132 (2006).
134. Id. at 132–33.
135. Id. at 133.
136. Id.; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the broad definitions
of “religious exercise” contained in the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act and state religious freedom restoration acts).
137. See Smith, 394 U.S. at 887.
138. Id. at 877.
139. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940). The Court stated:
In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining
a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom. No one would
contest the proposition that a State may not, by statute, wholly deny the
right to preach or to disseminate religious views. Plainly such a previous and
absolute restraint would violate the terms of the guarantee. It is equally clear
that a State may by general and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the
times, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, and of holding
meetings thereon; and may in other respects safeguard the peace, good
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includes statutes enacted not to interfere with religious belief but
rather to ensure non-discriminatory access to public accommoda-
tions.140 Furthermore, those instances where courts have declined to
permit government regulation of religiously based conduct have
been limited to circumstances where the conduct is not prohibited
by law,141 inconsistent with rights asserted by others142 or imposes
more than an incidental burden upon a commercial activity.143 Public
accommodation statutes fit comfortably within these circumstances
as outlawing discrimination, recognizing the right of members of pro-
tected classes to be free from discrimination in the marketplace and
touching upon conduct in a manner incidental to the government’s
legitimate regulation of commercial activity.144
B. Religious Exemptions to Public Accommodation Statutes:
An Inadvisable Compromise
1. Introduction
Assuming the existence of a credible threat to religious rights
posed by public accommodation statutes and that commercial activi-
ties of businesses involve the exercise of such rights, there is a tempta-
tion to expand existing exemptions relating to religious organizations
to include secular for-profit businesses.145 There are several asserted
order and comfort of the community, without unconstitutionally invading
the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
140. See Jennifer Ann Abodeely, Comment, Thou Shall Not Discriminate: A Proposal
for Limiting First Amendment Defenses to Discrimination in Public Accommodations, 12
SCHOLAR 585, 602 (2010) (concluding that public accommodation laws “were not enacted
with the intent to violate the religious views of certain individuals; instead they were put
in place to provide protection and a legal remedy for people who face discrimination in
the absence of such legal protections”).
141. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 876. (concluding that religious based conduct may
be free from government regulation when “the conduct at issue . . . was not prohibited
by law”).
142. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 604 (1961) (concluding that conduct
that brings persons “into collision with rights asserted by any other individual. . . . most
frequently require[s] intervention of the State to determine where the rights of one end
and those of another begin. . . .” (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
630 (1943))).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (“When followers of a par-
ticular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept
on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on
the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.”).
144. See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008, at 10 (Colo. Office of
Admin. Cts. Dec. 6, 2013) (initial decision granting Complainants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment and denying Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment).
145. For a discussion of exemptions to public accommodation statutes for religious orga-
nizations, see supra notes 102–06 and accompanying text. For a discussion of exemptions
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bases for such an expansion. For example, it may be contended that
there can be no distinction between free exercise rights of religious
organizations and similar rights asserted by businesses. Utilizing this
approach, considerable doubt may be cast upon governmental inter-
ests underlying exemptions for a specific religious practice that does
not extend to others engaged in the same practice.146 The U.S.
Supreme Court’s opinion in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao do Vegetal lends support to this approach to the extent that
the Court overturned the government’s ban upon the religious use of
hoasca based upon its long-standing exception to the use of another
hallucinogen, specifically, peyote, by the Native American Church.147
Both substances had “high potential for abuse,” “no currently ac-
cepted medical use,” and presented safety concerns for users.148 How-
ever, the granting and maintenance of an exception for the use of
peyote for more than thirty years made it impossible for the Court
to refuse to grant a similar exception for hoasca use by members of
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal.149 This approach has
been further bolstered by the Court’s holding in Hobby Lobby grant-
ing for-profit corporations an exemption to a portion of the Affordable
Care Act’s contraceptive mandate closely resembling that which the
Act previously granted to religious organizations.150
Other commentators have adopted a justification for the expan-
sion of religious exemptions based upon exemptions granted to secular
interests.151 There are significant differences between the suggested
approaches. Some commentators have contended that exemptions
from generally applicable laws for secular interests justifies the
application of strict scrutiny to governmental refusals to grant simi-
lar exemptions for religious practices.152 Other commentators have
to public accommodation statutes in the context of same-sex marriage, see supra note 107
and accompanying text.
146. See Brownstein, supra note 133, at 115 (contending that in free exercise cases,
courts should look to other religious exemptions granted by the government, compare the
practices and, if they raise similar concerns and the government exempts one practice
from the law but not the other, “conclud[e] that the [government’s asserted] interest lacks
substance”); see also CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 92–93 (2007) (discussing Smith and suggesting that
Oregon acted unconstitutionally by banning the use of peyote in all circumstances while
exempting Christian churches from the prohibition of the sale of alcohol in dry counties).
147. 546 U.S. 418, 433, 439 (2006).
148. Id. at 432.
149. Id. at 433–37.
150. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505, at
*43–*45 (U.S. June 30, 2014) (granting free exercise rights to closely held secular busi-
nesses regardless of corporate form and their central profit-making objective).
151. See Kaplan, supra note 53, at 1047 n.9.
152. See Duncan, supra note 53, at 850–51. This approach is based upon the result in
Employment Division v. Smith in which the Court concluded that the presence of ex-
emptions for secular interests without corresponding religious exemptions rendered subject
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advocated for a “rough equality for religious groups in a secular
world.”153 This “rough equality” may take many different forms. In its
minimalist form, equality may simply prohibit laws that deliberately
target religion.154 Other commentators have argued that every secular
exemption should be accompanied by a religious exemption.155 A com-
promise view would require a secular exemption as a prerequisite
for a religious exemption and would then determine whether the
secular exemption endangered underlying legislative purposes to a
lesser or greater degree than a religious exemption.156 Regardless of
their differences, all of these approaches conclude that exemptions
for secular interests are relevant as they provide “objective informa-
tion” courts may consider in striking the balance between religion
and public policy that is inherent in every free exercise case.157
2. The Unworkability of Religious Exemptions
The case for religious exemptions should be rejected regardless
of the basis upon which it is advanced. An initial problem lies with
the granting of the exemptions themselves. Once granted, religious
exemptions will take on lives of their own and quite likely will become
permanent. It is unlikely that courts will invalidate a legislatively
granted exemption. It is even more unlikely that legislatures would
revoke a religious exemption once created. The circumstances under
which governments may revoke a previously granted religious ex-
emption remain largely undecided by the courts and unaddressed
laws no longer neutral or of general applicability, thus requiring rigorous review. See
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
153. Lund, supra note 53, at 637. The need for equality is based upon difficulties that
religious groups may encounter in securing exemptions during the legislative process;
see Laycock, supra note 56, at 57. But see Lund, supra note 53, at 638 (“Religious groups
are further helped by the very nature of the legislative process, which is conducive to the
creation of secular exceptions. . . . [as] [t]he nature of legislation often turns on compromise;
legislators make exceptions for groups in order to win over opposition.”).
154. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 71, 71 n.3, 72 (2001) (contending that the Free Exercise Clause “protects only against
statutes that target religious practice”); Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 599 (1998) (contending that the Free Exercise Clause only prohibits
“religious gerrymanders, laws which, upon close inspection, are designed intentionally
to disadvantage religion”).
155. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 56, at 49–50 (referring to reciprocity in granting
exemptions as “most-favored nation status” for religious interests). But see Eugene
Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1540
(1999) (criticizing reciprocity for secular and religious exceptions as unworkable, as
“virtually all laws, including those widely seen as aiming at quite serious harms, contain
many secular exceptions”).
156. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 53, at 640; Volokh, supra note 155, at 1542; Kaplan,
supra note 53, at 1078–79; Kenneth D. Sansom, Note, Sharing the Burden: Exploring the
Space Between Uniform and Specific Applicability in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence,
77 TEX. L. REV. 753, 767–70 (1999).
157. See Brownstein, supra note 133, at 127.
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in the academic literature.158 The scant judicial record aside, the “core
problem” is the distinct possibility that the government can never
eliminate or shrink previously granted exemptions.159 Any such effort
would not be neutral as its objective would be to increase burdens
upon those individuals and businesses who previously enjoyed the
benefit of the exemption.160 Any revocation effort also would not be
generally applicable as it would be directed specifically at religious
beneficiaries.161 The presence of secondary secular objectives under-
lying a revocation would be irrelevant due to the absence of neutrality
and general applicability.162
There are only two possibilities for any given religious exemp-
tion if it cannot be revoked. One possibility is that the exemption
remains unaltered and becomes a static part of free exercise law. As
a result, ill-conceived exemptions with potentially deleterious conse-
quences may become a permanent part of the legal landscape. How-
ever, this possibility is unlikely as this is generally not how the legal
system operates. The U.S. legal system, especially in the field of con-
stitutional law, focuses on interpretation and challenging boundaries.
It is far more likely that a religious exemption will be tested, inter-
preted and expanded beyond those circumstances serving as its origi-
nal justification. These possibilities should give courts and legislatures
pause before creating exemptions to public accommodation statutes.163
158. See, e.g., St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 632
(7th Cir. 2007) (upholding an amendment to the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration
Act allowing for the relocation of cemeteries in order to permit expansion and moderniza-
tion of O’Hare International Airport); Freeman v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor
Vehicles, 924 So.2d 48, 56–57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding an amendment of the
Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act to require full face photographs for purposes
of driver’s licenses and identification cards); see also Lund, supra note 17, at 494 (describing
revocation of religious exceptions as “a remarkably undertheorized question in the law-
and-religion field[,] [as] Free Exercise . . . scholarship focuses on the circumstances in
which exemptions can be given. [But] [i]t tends not to focus on the circumstances in which
exemptions can be taken back.”).
159. Lund, supra note 17, at 494.
160. Id. at 495.
161. Id.
162. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524
(1993) (concluding that “the principle of general applicability was violated because the
secular ends asserted in defense of the laws were pursued only with respect to conduct
motivated by religious beliefs”).
163. See Lund, supra note 17, at 495 (“Once legislatures become aware that they cannot
revoke religious exemptions, they will hesitate to ever give them.”). But see Chapman,
supra note 77, at 1804 (proposing a religious exemption for sexual orientation which would
“allow [for] incremental narrowing of the exemption as time goes on and public or legal
opinion shifts”). Chapman’s proposal is flawed in several respects. The proposal fails to
take heed of the free exercise principles of neutrality and general applicability to which
any subsequent narrowing would be subjected. Clearly, any narrowing would be directed
at those individuals or organizations engaging in discrimination on the basis of religious
beliefs and thus would lack the necessary neutrality. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res.
of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). It would also violate the general applicability
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The creation of religious exemptions also raises the issue of
vital services. There is a distinct possibility that the LGBT commu-
nity may be denied access to vital services if all religious objectors
were provided with the option to deny goods and services based
upon actual or perceived sexual orientation.164 There is no guarantee
that any statutorily based exemption will contain language prevent-
ing providers of such goods and services from denying access on the
basis of sexual orientation. There is also no guarantee that legislatures
will adequately craft an exemption for such providers.
A general definition of vital goods and services may be achiev-
able.165 However, there would be controversy and likely omissions
in identifying providers of vital services beyond vague platitudes about
public safety. For example, emergency room professionals and techni-
cians are undoubtedly vital to the preservation of health and life.166
Does this mean, however, that all emergency room personnel must
render aid despite religious objections to homosexuality? Does such
an exemption apply to other important health care issues such as the
decision to become a parent and access to routine medical care? The
answer to this question is clear in California but not in other states
that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.167
There are open questions as to the identity of other providers of emer-
gency services and whether such entities should be included in any
requirement as any narrowing would be directed only at the discriminatory practices
purportedly motivated by religious beliefs. Id.; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 524 (noting that the Florida legislature’s decision to statutorily
disallow animal sacrifice as part of the Santeria religion was impermissible because “their
official actions violated the Nation’s essential commitment to religious freedom”). The
proposal also does not contain a mechanism by which legislatures may narrow previously
granted exemptions and fails to address what would undoubtingly be individual and
institutional reluctance to take action perceived to be at the expense of religion and
favoring a historically unpopular group as the LGBT community. Additionally, the proposal
does not account for the tendency of statutory exceptions to evolve and expand over time
through subsequent legislative action and judicial decisions. Finally, the proposal imper-
missibly triggers narrowing of religious exemptions based upon shifts in public opinion
presumably regarding sexual orientation. Even assuming a shift sufficient to support the
narrowing of an existing exemption, the free exercise of religion is not subject to restraint
based upon the whims of public opinion or the perceived acceptability of the beliefs and
practices associated therewith.
164. See, e.g., Muehlmeyer, supra note 66, at 809 (noting that “the typical LGBT experi-
ence with discrimination . . . occur[s] . . . in transactions that involve cultural values and
close personal interaction”).
165. See Chapman, supra note 77, at 1815 (proposing an exception to religious exemp-
tions on the basis of “the health, life, or material pecuniary interest of an individual”).
166. Id. at 1804.
167. See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Superior Court,
189 P.3d 959, 968 (Cal. 2008) (“The [Unruh Civil Rights] Act further[ed] California’s
compelling interest in ensuring full and equal access to medical treatment irrespective
of sexual orientation . . . .”).
2015] PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION STATUTES 357
exemption.168 The feasibility of a “vital services” exemption is fur-
ther undermined by the wide variety of services defined by state law
as “vital.”169
Enforcement of such an exemption presents many problems. For
example, how are determinations of “vital services” to be made by
legislators with any degree of specificity and confidence that their
intent will be faithfully executed by decision-makers who are directly
impacted and upon whom the burden of compliance falls? Compliance
is perhaps best assured through “the threat of administrative action
or litigation.”170 It is unlikely that such threats would be incorpo-
rated into any statutory scheme given the sensitivity of topics touching
upon religious practices, and any penalties included in such a scheme
are likely to be mild. Furthermore, a provider of goods and services
outside the scope of a “vital services” designation ironically may be
permitted to discriminate despite the fact that the individual seek-
ing access supports such provider through his or her tax dollars.
That such a determination may be made upon perceived sexual orien-
tation is all the more distressing.
An exemption for hardship is equally inadvisable. This proposed
exemption provides that a business would be permitted to refuse
service on the basis of sexual orientation unless it was the only one
capable of providing the good or service in question and the burden
upon the potential customer would be heavy.171 A provider would be
168. See Chapman, supra note 77, at 1815 (proposing the designation of motel
accommodations, rescue teams, tow companies and gasoline stations in remote areas as
“vital services”).
169. See, e.g., 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 1240(a) (declaring emergency medical services to be
vital); 2008 Cal. Stat. ch. 393 § 1(b) (declaring services associated with health care, educa-
tion, job training, and public safety to be vital); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/17-55 (West
2014) (defining “vital services” to include “services provided by medical personnel or
institutions, fire departments, emergency services agencies, national defense contractors,
armed forces or militia personnel, private and public utility companies, or law enforcement
agencies”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.010(2) (West 2014) (defining vital services as those
“necessary for the peace, health, safety and welfare of the people of this state”); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-11.1(6) (West 2014) (declaring access to “heat, electricity [and] water”
to be vital services); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:5B-22.1(d) (West 2014) (declaring services
provided by “quality family child care providers” to be vital); 1994 N.Y. Laws ch. 546 § 1
(“declar[ing] that check cashers provide important and vital services to New York
citizens”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 22–23 (McKinney 2014) (providing for state and local gov-
ernment disaster preparedness with respect to the restoration of “vital services”); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 19-14.4-2(b) (West 2014) (“declar[ing] that check cashing businesses
provide important and vital services to Rhode Island citizens”); 1981 Wash. Sess. Laws
1374 (declaring services associated with “public safety, public health, and fire protection”
to be “vital”).
170. See Chapman, supra note 77, at 1815.
171. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty
Claims Have in Common, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 206, 208 (2010) (proposing a hardship
exception in the context of same-sex marriage); Douglas Laycock, Afterword to SAME-SEX
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denied the benefit of this exemption if the potential customer could
satisfy both prongs. There are several difficulties with this exemp-
tion as proposed. First, the exemption improperly places the burden
of proof on potential customers who have been denied goods or service.
But any exemption from public accommodation statutes should be
an exception and not a rule. The burden of proof of entitlement to
any exemption should fall on the potential beneficiary and not the
current victim.
Additionally, the first prong of the exemption requires constant
determinations regarding the identity of alternate providers of goods
and services in the market in question.172 This need for constant moni-
toring places substantial burdens on businesses seeking to utilize
the exemption and requires them to determine whether goods and
services offered by other providers are adequate substitutes.173 The
measurement of hardship to individuals denied goods or services is
also problematic. Possible factors include increases in cost to potential
customers, their financial ability to bear such costs and the geo-
graphic availability of substitute services.174 These factors would need
to be accounted for in any statutory exemption. A legislative balance
satisfactory to all parties and that is readily adaptable to the myr-
iad of circumstances in which it would arise is improbable.175 Reli-
ance upon courts to make such determinations suffers from these
same problems as well as injects additional costs and uncertainty
associated with litigation.176
Another possible exemption that should be discouraged is for
small businesses.177 Advocates equate the numerous small business
exemptions contained within a wide range of federal statutes with
a potential exemption from public accommodation laws.178 However,
MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 200 (Douglas Laycock et al.
eds., 2008) (proposing a hardship exception in the context of same-sex marriage).
172. See Chapman, supra note 77, at 1814 (noting that a hardship exception would
“require that each type of business be catalogued so as to keep abreast of its competitors
and new additions or losses to the market”).
173. Id. (“This [hardship exception] puts a great burden on the business to remain
cognizant of every new move, as well as to rely on its own judgment about whether a
service or business is substantially similar enough to be considered a substitute.”).
174. Id. at 1808.
175. Id. at 1815 (“Also, from a fairness perspective, it does not make sense to punish
one owner because he or she happens to have the only business of its type in town.”).
Chapman also concludes that “[o]n a political level . . . it is very unlikely that such an
exception would pass as it is essentially placing the gay individual’s right to public ac-
commodation higher than the proprietor’s religious-liberty right.” Id. at 1814–15.
176. Id. at 1814.
177. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 171, at 227 (“Small businesses that provide personal
services tend to be direct embodiments of the owner’s identity.”); Chapman, supra note
77, at 1807–10.
178. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) (exempting enterprises with fourteen or
fewer employees from compliance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Id. § 12111(5)(A)
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this equation fails on several grounds. The underlying motivation for
statutory exemptions from the Civil Rights Act and the Americans
with Disabilities Act were financial, specifically, the desire not to
burden small businesses with compliance costs.179 Cost is not the
primary motivating factor with respect to exempting small businesses
from public accommodation statutes with respect to sexual orienta-
tion. The primary motivating factor instead is to validate discrimi-
nation against a specific group of individuals either possessing or
believed to possess a particular characteristic to which the small
business owner objects. These differences in motivation render equa-
tion of these exemptions suspect.
It also bears to note that definitions of what constitutes a
“small business” differ. The Civil Rights Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act define small businesses based upon the number of
employees.180 However, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby
extended free exercise rights to the corporate plaintiffs not based upon
the number of employees but rather upon their status as close cor-
porations.181 The clear implication from this decision is that owner-
ship structure rather than size is an important factor for corporate
exercises of religious rights. As noted in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent,
these so-called “small businesses” may in fact be quite large with
sizable revenue and numbers of employees.182 Such businesses are
a far cry from truly small “mom and pop” establishments. The harm
that a religious exemption for such businesses may cause to individ-
ual potential customers and the cause of equal access to public ac-
commodations would be magnified.
Furthermore, as noted by Justice Ginsburg, the logic of the major-
ity opinion in Hobby Lobby extends free exercise rights to “corpora-
tions of any size, public or private.”183 Such an extension is necessarily
fatal to a small business exemption as it applies to all corporations
regardless of size. The holding in Hobby Lobby also disproves the
“attenuation argument” in support of a small business exemption.184
This argument contends that the larger a business becomes, the less
justification exists for personal identification of the owner’s religious
(exempting enterprises with fourteen or fewer employees from compliance with the
Americans with Disabilities Act).
179. See Chapman, supra note 77, at 1808.
180. Id. at 1807.
181. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505, at *58,
*61 (U.S. June 30, 2014).
182. Id. at *128–*29 n.19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Mars, Inc. ($33 billion in
revenues and 72,000 employees) and Cargill, Inc. ($136 billion in revenues and 140,000
employees) as two examples of family-owned or closely held businesses potentially within
the scope of the majority’s opinion).
183. Id. at *128.
184. See Chapman, supra note 77, at 1810.
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beliefs with the business’s operations.185 As a result, claims that the
owner’s religious rights have been infringed become less credible,
and the business should not be permitted to discriminate.186 The hold-
ing in Hobby Lobby extending free exercise rights to all corporations
regardless of revenues, number of employees or market impact under-
cuts the argument that justification for discrimination terminates
because the relationship between the owner’s religious principles and
the operation of the business become attenuated as a result of growth.
Finally, it is naïve to assume that the bigger the business, the less
likely it is to assert religious rights should an exemption be granted.
The majority’s assurance in Hobby Lobby that it is “unlikely” that
large publicly traded companies will avail themselves of their free
exercise rights is pure speculation.187 It is also cold comfort for po-
tential victims of discrimination other than racial minorities who
the Court identified as the sole group not subject to discrimination
on religious grounds.188 This is particularly the case with respect to
the LGBT community which has been a historical target for discrim-
ination.189 It is also inconsistent with the profit model to conclude
that a majority of businesses would elect to forego growth in order
to preserve their exemption.190 Instead, such businesses could elect
to grow beyond any designated limitation and assert that the free
exercise right found in Hobby Lobby knows no boundaries relative
to size or ownership structure.191
185. See, e.g., id. (“Once an entity reaches a critical mass, the justification for an owner’s
feeling that his or her religious freedoms have been infringed upon through a personal
identification with his or her business, or through in-person interactions with same-sex
individuals, becomes less credible.”); Laycock, supra note 171, at 199 (“Large businesses
take up more market share, and an owner’s claim of personal responsibility for everything
that happens in his business grows more attenuated as the business expands, so a sensible
legislative provision would be to put a limit on the size of [the] businesses eligible to
claim an exemption.”).
186. See Chapman, supra note 77, at 1810. Chapman contends that growth creates a
“tipping point,” after which time:
[T]he owner should no longer be entitled to an exemption that would allow
him or her substantially to affect commerce while discriminating on the basis
of sexual orientation, because often growth will mean [that] the relationship
between the owner’s role in the business and the justification for the exemp-
tion will be too attenuated.
Id.
187. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505, at *58.
188. Id. at *87.
189. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 77, at 1785–86, 1789–90.
190. See id. at 1810 (“Owners who feel that their rights would be infringed no matter
what their entity’s size can make a choice to forego growth and ensure the business stays
under a certain size.”).
191. Chapman concedes that the number of businesses that would forego growth in
order to preserve a religious exemption “may be fewer than expected.” Id. at 1810 n.131.
It is likely that this number would be none at all in the wake of the majority’s reasoning
in Hobby Lobby.
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Yet another variety of proposed exemption concerns same-sex
marriage. Although beyond the scope of this Article, same-sex mar-
riage considerations must be addressed to the extent they relate to
possible exemptions from public accommodation statutes. A same-
sex marriage exemption may take many different forms. For exam-
ple, the exemption could relate to goods, services and facilities relating
to the solemnization or celebration of marriages that violate the reli-
gious beliefs of individuals and businesses. This exemption would
most likely resemble those granted to religious organizations by states
which have endorsed same-sex marriage through legislation.192 How-
ever, claims for religious exemptions by secular for-profit businesses
have been rejected by courts and administrative agencies to date.193
Other proposals for a religious exemption in the same-sex mar-
riage context are much broader. For example, the Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty advocates exempting religious objectors from “facili-
tating” same-sex marriage.194 Religious objectors could refuse to hire
persons in same-sex marriages, extend benefits to same-sex spouses,
make their property or services available for same-sex marriage
ceremonies and provide housing to same-sex couples.195 The Becket
Fund urges courts and legislatures to adopt these exemptions in a
“robust” manner.196
A religious exemption immunizing refusals to facilitate same-sex
marriage is far too vague and capable of abuse to be a serious basis
for legislation.197 Any action that makes same-sex marriage easier
could be considered facilitation beyond simply providing a venue,
invitations, flowers, and a cake.198 Business decisions affecting the
availability of housing, employment, and job benefits to same-sex
192. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 58–68 (N.M. 2013)
(holding that a for-profit business’s refusal to photograph a same-sex commitment cere-
mony violated the New Mexico Human Rights Act and enforcement of the Act did not
violate the photographer’s free exercise rights); Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No.
CR 2013-0008, at 1–2 (Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n May 30, 2014) (upholding a determination
by the Office of Administrative Courts that a bakery’s refusal to sell a wedding cake to
a same-sex couple violated the Colorado public accommodation statute and enforcement
of the statute did not violate the owner’s free exercise rights).
194. BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND STATE ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 2 (Jan. 2009), available at http://becketfund.org/wp-content
/uploads/2011/04/same-sex-marriage-and-state-anti-discrimination-laws-with
-appendices.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4UF7-VBW7.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 7.
197. See Michael Kent Curtis, Essay, A Unique Religious Exemption from Antidis-
crimination Laws in the Case of Gays? Putting the Call for Exemptions for Those Who
Discriminate Against Married or Marrying Gays in Context, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
173, 194 (2012).
198. See WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, supra note 26, at 228
(defining “facilitate” as “to make easy or easier”).
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couples could facilitate or deter them from marriage.199 Should reli-
gious objections to same-sex marriage permit a landlord to refuse to
rent an apartment to a same-sex couple? Should such objections allow
an employer to threaten an employee with termination should he or
she have a same-sex partner let alone marry them? The answer to
these questions must be “yes” utilizing the Becket Fund’s facilitation
standard. Living arrangements and financial stability are after all
important considerations for any couple contemplating marriage.
Any action that makes these considerations easier for a same-sex
couple thus facilitates a subsequent marriage.
A facilitation exemption is also very broad and could serve as a
defense to other types of discrimination. It is unlikely that any such
exemption would be limited to married same-sex couples. Assuming
the basis for the exemption is objection to homosexuality rather
than the institution of marriage, then the exemption should logi-
cally extend to unmarried members of the LGBT community.200 If
the purpose for the exemption is to recognize and protect sincere reli-
gious beliefs, then why should an exemption from antidiscrimination
laws, including public accommodation statutes, be limited to homo-
sexuals? If this is the true purpose, then an exemption should permit
different treatment of any group, individual or conduct upon which
there is a religious viewpoint.201 This may include unmarried hetero-
sexual couples who cohabitate, members of particular ethnic groups,
adherents to other faiths, atheists, and women.202 Such results appear
199. See Curtis, supra note 197, at 194.
200. Id. at 183, 194.
201. Id. at 194.
202. One might imagine a circumstance in which a secular for-profit business refuses
to serve persons who have certain physical traits or clothing which leads the business’s
owner to perceive such persons as associated with a particular religion, ethnicity or country
of origin to which owner has a faith-based objection. For example, a Christian or Jewish
business owner could refuse service to a customer whose traits or clothing cause them
to perceive that the individual is from a country that is hostile to Israel. A religious
exemption would permit business owners to discriminate against persons of other faiths
or no faith whatsoever. For example, the same business owner would be permitted to refuse
service to a woman wearing a hijab based upon his perception that she is a Muslim or an
individual wearing a T-shirt or button doubting the existence of a supreme being. Women
could be subjected to many different forms of religion-based discrimination. Examples
include a business that fires an unmarried woman who becomes pregnant, a woman who
lives with a sexual partner outside of marriage, a woman who seeks employment or travels
without the express permission or company of her husband or a male relative, and any
woman who fails to conform to a business owner’s perception of proper gender roles. The
examples are virtually limitless given the myriad of religious beliefs and practices in the
United States. No matter however as a sincere religious viewpoint regarding any person
or circumstance would be all that is needed to trigger the exemption. Of course, many
of these practices would be prohibited by federal law. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a),
2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). However, an issue remains as to whether the Court’s sole reference
to race discrimination in Hobby Lobby may be interpreted as permitting religious beliefs
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to be permissible from the Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby which only
prohibited race discrimination on religious grounds.203
The scope of any religious exemption ultimately may prove irrele-
vant. If an exemption protects sincerely held religious beliefs, then
it becomes a potential excuse for widespread discrimination that
serves to weaken public accommodation and antidiscrimination laws
that protect not only the LGBT community but other historically
oppressed groups.204 If the scope is limited to the LGBT community,
then it is clear that the underlying purpose is not the protection of
religious belief but rather anti-gay animus.205 Proponents of reli-
gious exemptions cannot have it both ways. Either exemptions are
intended to apply to all religious beliefs, thereby permitting discrim-
ination under any circumstance in which such beliefs are offended,
or they are limited to homosexuality, thereby expressing an under-
lying purpose opposed to gay equality and liberty rather than for the
purpose of securing religious freedom.
Assuming that the scope of any religious exemption is limited,
moral condemnation is an insufficient basis upon which to deprive the
LGBT community of its rights.206 Religious exemptions in this context
re-inject the irrelevant “morality determination” into decision-making
in a manner antithetical to public accommodation statutes.207 Public
accommodation statutes by their nature are free from moral judg-
ments. All persons are permitted to access and enjoy public accommo-
dations regardless of their physical characteristics or beliefs. In per-
mitting such access and enjoyment, these statutes separate the issue
to serve as a basis for other types of discrimination. Courts and legislatures may very well
be confronted with such claims in future cases. Such a result is an invitation to deeper
sectarian conflicts and societal rifts and further judicial intervention into religious prac-
tices. See Roberts, supra note 13 (providing other examples of potential discrimination
and concluding that religious exemptions give “individual and businesses the right to dis-
criminate in the name of the Lord. Or Allah. Or Buddha or Ba’al or whatever supreme
being they may worship”).
203. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505, at
*87 (U.S. June 30, 2014) (stating that the Court’s opinion did not provide a “shield” for
racial discrimination on the basis of religion as “[t]he Government has a compelling
interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard
to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that
critical goal.”).
204. See Curtis, supra note 197, at 195–96.
205. See id. at 195.
206. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (concluding that “ ‘if the constitutional
conception of “equal protection of the laws” means anything, it must at the very least mean
that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legiti-
mate governmental interest’ ” (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973));
see also Abodeely, supra note 140, at 601 (“[M]oral disapproval of a certain group is no
excuse to deprive the group’s members of their rights.”).
207. Lin, supra note 127, at 721.
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of discrimination from moral or social acceptance.208 Citizens may
not agree with one another’s beliefs and practices, but most can agree
that targeting individuals for different treatment in the context of
public accommodations is indefensible.209 Simply put, permitting
non-discriminatory access to public accommodations is not the equiv-
alent of moral or social acceptance. Permitting religious carve-outs
injects individuals, businesses and governments into a polarizing
and unnecessary debate by equating equal treatment with moral
acceptance,210 a debate that appears increasingly lost for those opposed
to societal acceptance of homosexuality and the LGBT community.211
Such equation undermines not only public accommodation statutes
but other antidiscrimination laws which have enhanced equality and
practical liberty.212
208. See id. at 748 (discussing the role of anti-discrimination statutes on eliminating the
morality debate).
209. See Shawn M. Filippi & Edward J. Reeves, Equality or Further Discrimination?
Sexual Orientation Nondiscrimination in Oregon Statutory Employment Law After Tanner
v. OHSU, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 269, 280–81 (1999) (comparing public attitudes
about employment discrimination and social acceptance of the LGBT community).
210. See Lin, supra note 127, at 748; see also Andrew M. Jacobs, The Rhetorical Con-
struction of Rights: The Case of the Gay Rights Movement, 1969–1991, 72 NEB. L. REV.
723, 735–36 (1993) (contending that the gay rights movement gained greater societal
acceptance by abandoning the morality debate in favor of equality and “victimage
rhetoric”). But see Abodeely, supra note 140, at 601 (discussing the view of Christian
advocacy groups that “any legislation benefitting LGBT people as a class stands in direct
conflict with others’ right to freely exercise their religion” and that “[s]ince these groups’
interpretation of religious text informs them that homosexuality is immoral, they believe
that, based on their religious beliefs, they should be able to refuse service, medical treat-
ment, employment, and other accommodations to LGBT people”); Richard F. Duncan,
Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and
Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 399 (1994) (questioning whether
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation should not be analogized to race discrimi-
nation as homosexuality is “morally controversial” and wrong); Rev. Austin Miles, Hated
for All the Right Reasons, CHRISTIAN COALITION OF AMER. (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.cc
.org/blog/hated_all_right_reasons, archived at http://perma.cc/NA3M-J4PY (contending
that the “homosexual lobby” has attacked and threatened “anyone they observe whose
living standards put a spotlight on their own sins,” that such critics are “evil for the sake
of evil,” and are “the last chance of the enemy to corrupt as many as he can for himself
to take them with him to the pits of hell”); Kevin Theriot, The Homosexual Agenda
Marches Steadily Forward, ALLIANCE DEFENSE FUND (Jan. 8, 2011), http://blog.speakup
movement.org/church/religious-freedom/the-homosexual-agenda-marches-steadily
-forward/, archived at http://perma.cc/7K6E-GR7L (claiming that “a legal right to engage
in homosexual behavior comes at the cost of religious freedom,” that homosexuality has
a “grave moral impact” on marriage, families and Christians’ understanding as being the
“bride of Christ” and that government leaders are imposing sexual immorality upon the
country and “will lose the political will or power to merrily continue on this road to de-
bauchery” only with intervention by the “Church of America”).
211. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
212. Curtis, supra note 197, at 180; see also W. Cole Durham, Jr., State RFRAs and the
Scope of Free Exercise Protection, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 667 (1999) (contending that
“there is a presumption against differential treatment, and “[e]xemptions for religiously
motivated conduct are, thus, presumptively questionable”).
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3. Exemptions and the Creation of a Two-Tier Society
A rollback of equality and liberty at this late date heralds a return
to a two-tier society and places the government’s imprimatur on dis-
criminatory practices. Broad-based religious exemptions may be
thought of as across-the-board simultaneous amendments of every
statute in a state code that imposes some obligation to which an
individual or association has a religious objection.213 The state may
have a compelling interest with respect to some of these statutes,
and others may be the least restrictive alternative by which to
achieve these interests. The state may nevertheless be required to
defend each and every statute. The result in some cases may be to
provide religious objectors “with a tool to bypass the effects of neu-
tral, generally applicable laws on the basis of religious reasons that
are unavailable to objectors with nonreligious reasons.”214 Exemp-
tions granted under such circumstances “would not be available to
those who object to homosexuality on nonreligious grounds.” 215
As a result, religious objectors would occupy a privileged position
with respect to every state and local law or policy.216 This preferen-
tial position in the marketplace impermissibly fails to “leave space
for other[s] . . . who believe something different.” 217 In the eloquent
words of Justice Bosson in Elane Photography, this space is “part of
the glue that holds us together as a nation, the tolerance that lubri-
cates the varied moving parts of us as a people.” 218 In Justice Bosson’s
words, this compromise “illuminates this country, setting it apart
from the discord that afflicts much of the rest of the world.” 219 Reli-
gious exemptions undermine this compromise, the respect that
citizens owe one another whether or not they share the same beliefs,
and invites discord and conflict.
213. See Lund, supra note 17, at 493 (characterizing state religious freedom restora-
tion acts as “simply amending every statute in a state’s code simultaneously, specifying
in each case that religious believers are exempt from the statute in question when it
burdens their religious exercise without the necessary justification”).
214. Lin, supra note 127, at 750; see also William P. Marshall, The Case Against the
Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357, 358
(1989).
215. Lin, supra note 127, at 750.
216. See Dolan, supra note 119, at 196 (criticizing the Illinois Religious Freedom
Restoration Act as a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution and an unlawful preference under the Illinois Constitution).
217. Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 80 (N.M. 2013) (Bosson, J.,
concurring); see also Brownstein, supra note 133, at 63 (“All else being equal, individuals
who hold religious beliefs . . . should not receive preferential treatment. We should all
be equal under the law.”).
218. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 80 (Bosson, J., concurring).
219. Id.
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Exemptions also may grant secular advantages to religious ob-
jectors. The beneficiaries of exemptions could “escape burdens or
receive benefits that have significant secular value.” 220 In the case of
public accommodation statutes, religious objectors may avoid pro-
viding goods and services to the LGBT community on faith-based
grounds, something unavailable to nonreligious individuals who
nevertheless object to homosexuality. Any cost savings associated with
discriminatory practices are a benefit of having secular values.221
Exemptions also may provide advantages to religious individuals
and businesses in the marketplace of ideas.222 Freedom from regula-
tion may empower these individuals and businesses, facilitate com-
munication of their message, and reduce their operational costs.223
This provides an advantage over nonreligious individuals and busi-
nesses subject to regulation and operating without the benefit of an
exemption.224 This privileging may “distort the marketplace of ideas
in favor of religious messages.” 225
Religious exemptions have the potential to cause harm to the
LGBT community, a community that has been subjected to a
historic pattern of widespread, pervasive and purposeful discrimi-
nation and unequal treatment at the federal and state levels.226
220. Brownstein, supra note 133, at 71.
221. See id. (discussing how religious exemptions allow certain groups to “avoid an
expense all other employers must bear”).
222. Id. at 64.
223. Id.
224. Id.; see also Ellis West, The Case Against A Right to Religion-Based Exemptions,
4 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 591, 601 (1990) (“[E]xemptions to certain
persons because of their religion . . . may give those religions . . . an unfair advantage
over other religions, secular ideologies, churches, nonprofit organizations, or businesses
with which they compete for members and money.”).
225. Brownstein, supra note 133, at 64–65.
226. At the federal level, the LGBT community is protected by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996).
However, sexual orientation is excluded as a protected class by numerous federal anti-
discrimination statutes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2014) (Equal Credit Opportunity Act); 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000e-2(a) (2014) (enumerating protected classes under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3604 (2014) (Fair Housing Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2014)
(defining protected individuals pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act). There
is no federal prohibition upon discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of
sexual orientation. At the state level, despite several recent and significant victories, same-
sex relationships were not recognized in any form in twenty-eight states at the time of
the preparation of this Article. See In Your State—Marriage and Relationships, LAMBDA
LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/states-regions, archived at http://perma.cc/3JXK
-DNWF (last visited Jan. 28, 2015) (click “marriage and relationships”; then click on
each state for more information). Additionally, nineteen states did not extend private or
public employment protection to the LGBT community at the time of the preparation of
this Article. See In Your State—Workplace, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org
/states-regions, archived at http://perma.cc/3JXK-DNWF (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).
There are no prohibitions upon discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of
sexual orientation at the state level other than the previously discussed statutes. See
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Antidiscrimination laws express government values of justice and
equality, ensure that goods and services are freely available to all
market participants, and protect individuals from humiliation and
dignitary harm.227 This dignitary harm is not restricted to impacted
individuals. Discrimination also harms society by depriving it of “the
benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and cultural
life.” 228 As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Romer, absent robust
legal protections, discrete groups could be excluded from an “almost
limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute
ordinary civic life in a free society.” 229 Creating a public accommoda-
tions carve-out for religious objectors on the basis of homosexuality
thus will not only cause the LGBT community dignitary harm but
will seriously hinder its ability to overcome “deep-rooted prejudice
against [its] integration into society.” 230 That this integration free
from discrimination is in the best interests of members of the com-
munity and society at large cannot be seriously questioned.
Even assuming the absence of a societal interest in eliminating
discrimination against the LGBT community, religious exemptions
are difficult to justify if they cause “significant harm to specific indi-
viduals or the members of a discrete class.” 231 Religious exemptions
subordinate, and perhaps sacrifice, important interests of individuals
and groups who do not adhere to the tenets of a particular faith so
that others may freely practice their faith without interference.232
These individuals and groups may be denied protections and benefits
provided by general rules of law, on the sole basis of a purported
conflict with the religious beliefs and practices of others.233 Affected
individuals and groups are forced to bear the entire cost of any
exemption, while others to whom there is no religious objection enjoy
the full benefits and protections of the law.234 Religious beliefs and
supra notes 24, 84–107 and accompanying text. Discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation also was not prohibited by the common law which adopted the view that busi-
nesses had “an absolute right to choose their customers and to exclude anyone from their
businesses for any reason unless limited by a civil rights statute [or other law such as those
applicable to innkeepers and common carriers].” Joseph William Singer, No Right to
Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1291 (1996).
227. See Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 64 (N.M. 2013); see also
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307–08 (1969) (describing the purpose of Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, in part, as “to remove the daily affront and humiliation involved in dis-
criminatory denials of access to facilities ostensibly open to the general public”).
228. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984).
229. 517 U.S. at 631.
230. Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 882 (N.M. 2013) (determining that same-sex couples
had a fundamental right to marry under New Mexico law).
231. Brownstein, supra note 133, at 128.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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practices are “unreasonably privileged” when they cause harm to
and impose unequal burdens upon individuals and groups.235
Individuals and groups should not have to suffer such harm and
bear such costs in the context of access to public accommodations.
Individuals have a right to be free from discriminatory practices when
they participate in the marketplace.236 In addition, the public has an
interest in ensuring that individuals are not excluded from access
to the marketplace “solely on the basis of group membership or immu-
table individual characteristics.” 237 This right and interest recognize
that an individual choosing to go into business must surrender some
freedom of action as his or her capacity to injure others increases as
a result of entry into the marketplace.238 This balance between in-
dividual rights, the public interest and the marketplace is not an
outlier but rather is “in accord with current settled values.” 239
Discrimination interferes with this balance by depriving individu-
als of the opportunity to contract and acquire property on an equal
basis.240 A refusal to do business with another based upon his or her
sexual orientation, no matter how religiously inspired, is an affront to
individual rights and the public interest.241 Although initially stated in
the context of race discrimination in public accommodations, the same
principle holds true with respect to sexual orientation, specifically,
that equality under the law requires that “a dollar in the hands of [a
member of the LGBT community] will purchase the same thing as a
dollar in the hands of [a member of the heterosexual community].” 242
4. The Alleged Corrective Role of the Marketplace
A religious exemption from public accommodation statutes as
they relate to sexual orientation may be defended by application of
235. Id. at 66; see also Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-
Party Harms, 84 MINN. L. REV. 589, 622 (2000) (contending that courts are less def-
erential to religious beliefs and practices when they “perceive third parties to be at risk
of harm”).
236. See Singer, supra note 226, at 1448.
237. Id.
238. See LESLIE A. CAROTHERS, THE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAW OF 1964: ARGU-
MENTS, ISSUES AND ATTITUDES IN A LEGAL DEBATE 11 (1968) (stating that businesses are
legitimately subject to regulation as they operate in the public realm and that “when a
man chooses to go into business . . . he loses part of his freedom of action because his
capacity to injure others has increased”).
239. Singer, supra note 226, at 1448.
240. Id. at 1451.
241. See Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 86 (N.M. 2013) (Bosson,
J., concurring) (concluding that the “refusal to do business with the same-sex couple in
this case, no matter how religiously inspired, was an affront to the legal rights of that
couple, the right granted them . . . to engage in the commercial marketplace free from
discrimination”).
242. Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968).
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market principles. Such a defense is based upon two distinct princi-
ples.243 First, there is no need for regulation as the exclusion of cus-
tomers is inconsistent with making money and maximizing profits.244
Businesses will be forced to act reasonably due to market pressures
and profit motives. Discrimination is also harmful to the community
by making the particular state or location “a less attractive place for
commercial enterprises to do business.” 245 Discrimination against
members of the LGBT community is particularly harmful and thus
unlikely given its enormous buying power.246
The second principle is that public accommodation statutes in-
crease the cost of doing business without a countervailing benefit.247
This principle posits that public accommodation statutes invite base-
less litigation.248 After all, businesses will only exclude customers with
good reason as to do otherwise would be inconsistent with making
money and maintenance of a positive reputation in the community.249
Thus, it is assumed that any decision to deny access to a potential
customer must have been for good cause. Public accommodation stat-
utes invite review of all decisions to exclude individuals or deny ser-
vice.250 Business owners should be free from such scrutiny as profit
motives will ensure that they act in a reasonable manner.251 From this
perspective, public accommodation statutes accomplish nothing
other than to “line the pockets of attorneys and subject businesses
243. See Singer, supra note 226, at 1447 (elaborating upon the corrective role of the
marketplace in public accommodation discrimination and the source of the two principles
discussed in the text).
244. Id.; see also Chapman, supra note 77, at 1820–21 (concluding that the market
may reduce discrimination as “participants that are focused on the bottom line . . . may
overlook their personal prejudices against employees, business owners, and consumers
if they can assist in maximizing profits” and “firms that discriminate against employees
or consumers based on race, religion, and sexual orientation . . . instead of characteristics
that have to with job performance, ability to pay, or any other rational economic reason,
will fare worse than other firms”); Muehlmeyer, supra note 66, at 809–11 (“One might
argue that free markets already provide enough incentive against discrimination
because establishments that discriminate against their customers lose business” and
“market incentives already ameliorate the problem because few people would turn down
making a quick buck selling some groceries to a gay person . . . . [as] few people would
even know or care about the sexual orientation of their customers.”).
245. Brief for New Mexico Small Businesses in Support as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellee Vanessa Willock at 15, Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M.
2013) (No. 33687).
246. See Press Release, Witeck Commc’ns, America’s LGBT 2013 Buying Power Esti-
mated at $830 Billion (Nov. 18, 2013) (on file with author). Witeck defines “buying power”
as “the total after-tax income available to an individual to spend on personal consumption,
personal interest payments or savings.” Id. at 2.
247. Singer, supra note 226, at 1447.
248. Id.
249. See id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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to needless litigation to prove that they acted reasonably.” 252 Such
businesses will bear additional costs associated with settling claims,
meritless or otherwise, when litigation expenses exceed settlement
costs.253
This confidence in the market is misplaced. Competitive pres-
sures and profit motives will not necessarily ensure equal and non-
discriminatory access to public accommodations.254 Biases against
the LGBT community may prevail as the community is relatively
small and is still the subject matter of widespread prejudice in many
parts of the country. The creation of a religious exemption merely
provides potential discriminators with a cover for their biases. The
market-based argument also ignores the fact that many for-profit
corporations engage in actions that are inconsistent with profit maxi-
mization based upon the religious beliefs of management. Busi-
nesses that forego sales by refusing to open on Sundays, such as
Hobby Lobby and Chick-fil-A, are just one example of actions incon-
sistent with profit maximization.255 This very possibility was ac-
knowledged in Hobby Lobby in which the Court held that “[w]hile
it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit corporations
is to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit
corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and
many do not do so.” 256
The argument that the adoption of public accommodation statutes
increases the cost of doing business by inviting frivolous litigation
is also suspect. Public accommodation statutes may generate law-
suits against businesses perceived to have improperly refused access
or service to a prospective customer. However, such claims would most
likely be filed in the absence of such statutes as it is a generally
accepted principle that businesses should not unreasonably refuse
252. Id.
253. Singer, supra note 226, at 1447.
254. See id. at 1448.
255. Estimates of lost sales due to Sunday closing are difficult to ascertain as Hobby
Lobby and Chick-fil-A are privately held businesses. It has been estimated that the Sunday
closing policy costs Hobby Lobby $100 million annually in lost sales. See Mary Vinnedge,
From the Corner Office: David Green of Hobby Lobby, SUCCESS (Sept. 1, 2010), http://
www.success.com/article/from-the-corner-office-david-green-of-hobby-lobby, archived at
http://perma.cc/AD9Z-TN2R; Manny Lopez, Marketplace: Hobby Lobby, UT-SANDIEGO
(Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/Nov/27/marketplace-hobby-lobby,
archived at http://perma.cc/WF48-KSTB. Chick-fil-A is estimated to forego $47.5 million
in annual revenue and $190 million in net worth as a result of its Sunday closure policy.
Tiffany Hsu, Chick-fil-A Money Machine: Cathay Brothers Are Billionaires, L.A. TIMES
(July 31, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/31/business/la-fi-mo-chickfila-cathay
-billionaire-20120731, archived at http://perma.cc/UHQ9-AXLF.
256. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505, at *46
(U.S. June 30, 2014).
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access or service.257 There is no reason to believe that a rule allowing
discrimination, under the guise of religion, against people possess-
ing or perceived to possess a specific characteristic, would not be
challenged as unreasonable, inconsistent with generally accepted
principles of public access and equality, unfairly targeting an unpop-
ular minority group, and capable of manipulation by some discrimi-
nators.258 Litigation is a risk of doing business regardless of the state
of the law. The broader question is whether the marketplace can
and should be trusted to respect and entrusted with enforcement of
such fundamental principles as equality and non-discrimination
without government guidance and oversight.
An additional basis for not relying exclusively upon the market-
place to resolve the problem of sexual orientation discrimination in
public accommodations is that such discrimination occurs more
frequently in transactions involving cultural values and personal
interaction than in so-called “quick buck transactions.” 259 Public
accommodations in the “cultural space” include healthcare, marital
services, civic and community associations, health clubs, and edu-
cational facilities.260 Cultural acceptance is perceived to be conferred
by accommodating members of the LGBT community with respect
to these services.261 There is thus a greater likelihood of values
conflicts and consequent resistance to accommodation under such
circumstances.262
Resolution to such conflicts should not be relegated to the
marketplace. If anything, such conflicts call for more robust public
accommodation protections. One suggestion in this regard is to adopt
a modern approach by expanding the definition of public accommo-
dations beyond simple “quick buck” transactions.263 A more modern
257. See Singer, supra note 226, at 1448.
258. See id.
259. See Muehlmeyer, supra note 66, at 809–11 (defining “quick buck transactions”
as simple and routine consumer transactions that involve limited personal interaction,
occur in a short period of time and do not implicate cultural values).
260. See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp. v. Sup. Ct., 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008) (access
to health care services); Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club, 115 P.3d 1212 (Cal.
2005) (family membership benefits); Monson v. Rochester Athletic Club, 759 N.W.2d 60
(Minn.App. 2009) (family membership benefits); Potter v. LaSalle Court Sports & Health
Club, 384 N.W.2d 873 (Minn. 1986) (discrimination directed at gay member of health
club); Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (photography ser-
vices); see also Muehlmeyer, supra note 66, at 809–10; Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating
the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1626–27 (2001)
(discussing public accommodations that fall within the “cultural space”).
261. See Muehlmeyer, supra note 66, at 810.
262. See id.
263. Id. But see Laycock, supra note 171, at 198 (stating that conflicts between
religious values, sexual orientation and public accommodations could be mitigated by
merchants announcing their refusal to serve same-sex couples on their websites or signs
posted outside of their premises). This proposal has been praised as putting the public
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approach would expand public accommodations beyond the tradi-
tional understanding of inns, restaurants, and public carriers.264
Such an expansion recognizes that individuals and businesses are
expected to adhere to reasonable regulations and societal expecta-
tions when they elect to enter the commercial world.265 This includes
matters concerning religious values. The U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized as much in holding that “[w]hen followers of a particular
sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits
they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith
are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are
binding on others in that activity.” 266 Such individuals relinquish
autonomy on the issue of the identity of the individuals they serve.267
Some state legislatures have recognized the need for an expanded
definition of public accommodations and have acted accordingly.268
on notice and holding those who have discriminatory views accountable. See Chapman,
supra note 77, at 1815. However, the proposal ignores the fact that postings of the right
to refuse service are prohibited in thirteen of the states that include sexual orientation
in their public accommodation statutes. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
Additional obstacles include the unlikelihood that state legislatures would burden
religious objectors through a posting requirement, the possibility of damage to the gay
rights movement as a result of public displays of disapproval, and the proposal’s failure
to address dignitary harms to the LGBT community incurred as a result of knowing in
advance that its members will be denied goods or services. See Chai R. Feldblum, Moral
Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 171, at 123, 153–56. A final practical difficulty is the
wording of any notice or posting. See Curtis, supra note 197, at 198.
264. See supra notes 81, 90–91 and accompanying text.
265. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 284 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (stating that “one who employ[s] his private property for purposes of com-
mercial gain by offering goods or services to the public must stick to his bargain”); see
also Brief of for ACLU Found. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee-Respondent,
at 10, Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (No. 33687) (“Once
a business chooses to commodify words or expression into a service offered to the general
public, it cannot use the First Amendment to hide from public accommodation laws that
apply to the commercial marketplace.”); Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty:
Gay Rights and Religion, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 119 (2006) (“Once individuals choose to
enter the stream of economic commerce by opening commercial establishments, I believe
it is legitimate to require that they play by certain rules.”); David M. Forman, A Room
for “Adam and Steve” at Mrs. Murphy’s Bed and Breakfast: Avoiding the Sin of
Inhospitality in Places of Public Accommodation, COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 326, 363 (2012)
(contending that public accommodation statutes do not force individuals to serve those
persons to which they have moral objections but rather require such service when indi-
viduals voluntarily elect to engage in activities with a commercial purpose).
266. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505, at *149–*50 (U.S. June 30, 2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (contending that the Court’s holding in Lee extends beyond the
taxes at issue in that case to other commercial activities).
267. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 314–15 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946)) (“The more an owner, for his advantage,
opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”).
268. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
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However, there remains a lack of uniformity in definitions which
should be addressed through expansion of accommodations to include
those operating in what are perceived to be “cultural spaces.” 269
5. Justice and Equality Considerations
There have been many arguments advanced in favor of religious
exemptions to laws in general and public accommodation statutes
in particular. These arguments consist of two related strands. An
initial contention is that religion occupies a privileged position in
the United States.270 As a result, the free exercise must be given
broad latitude even if this latitude injures others or impedes the
exercise of their rights.271 The second contention is that government-
ally imposed requirements or restrictions impermissibly burden free
exercise.272 This is particularly the case when such requirements or
restrictions purportedly force individuals to undertake actions in-
consistent with religious mandates, which are by their very nature
absolute and incapable of being compromised.273 Such is the case
with respect to state laws protecting the LGBT community from dis-
crimination and granting marriage rights regardless of religious ob-
jections to homosexuality.274
269. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 133, at 89–96 (stating that “[a]ll religious obli-
gations implicate freedom of conscience” and that religion serves four important social
purposes, specifically, providing “a source of values structurally divorced from gov-
ernment,” fostering spiritual growth “isolated from material concerns . . . . and indi-
vidual’s routine emphasis on material self-interest,” providing lives of participants with
a “communal dimension” and preserving continuity of beliefs and practices through
tradition); Durham, supra note 212, at 668 (“[R]eligious obligations are prior to other
obligations of civil society.”).
271. See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 133, at 80 (“Religion is privileged in the sense
that protecting its exercise justifies sacrificing the interests of others.”).
272. See id. (“Avoiding the privileging of religion (by prohibiting the harm causing con-
duct or requiring the payment of damages) effectively prevents the religious individual
from exercising his faith.”); see also Durham, supra note 212, at 669 (“[E]xemptions from
ordinary civil legislation do not constitute privileging of religion; they constitute respect
for and protection of the fundamental promise society makes to induce religious com-
munities to join the social compact in the first place.”); Douglas Laycock, The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REV. 221, 231–33 (1993) (claiming that only laws
addressing “the gravest abuses,” “paramount interests” of the “highest order,” or “essential
to national survival or to express constitutional norms” should survive judicial scrutiny
in the event of a conflict with religious liberty).
273. See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 133, at 134 (“When free exercise rights are at
issue . . . constitutional compromises seem less likely or even possible . . . . [as] religious
mandates are absolute. Nothing short of literal obedience is acceptable.”).
274. See Rena M. Lindevaldsen, The Fallacy of Neutrality from Beginning to End: The
Battle Between Religious Liberties and Rights Based on Homosexual Conduct, 4 LIBERTY
U. L. REV. 425, 461 (2010) (“Once the nation realizes that there will be a winner and a
loser, then the only question is whether religious liberties . . . should be suppressed to
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It bears to note however, whether admitted or not, that religious
freedom cases are determined by balancing competing interests in
order to reach a just result.275 There are no blanket exemptions for
religious practices regardless of whether one concedes religion’s
privileged position in the United States.276 Governmental require-
ments or restrictions burdening free exercise are constitutional as
long as the governmental interest is compelling and the requirement
or restriction is the least restrictive means.277 It is an imperfect
method by which to weigh individual and societal interests against
one another, but it has proven durable and workable.278
In the public accommodation arena, the balance must be struck
in favor of justice and equality. Discrimination in public accommo-
dations on the basis of sexual orientation is contrary to “the cher-
ished American ideals of justice and equality under the law.”279 In
many regards, it is analogous to racial and gender discrimination. As
in race and gender, sexual orientation is based upon unalterable bio-
logical and genetic factors.280 In a manner similar to racial minorities
and women, the LGBT community has endured a long history of per-
secution and discrimination. This persecution included criminality
promote legal recognition of same-sex relationships. For the Christian, the answer must
be ‘no’.”); see also Lynn D. Wardle, The Attack on Marriage as the Union of a Man and
a Woman, 83 N.D. L. REV. 1365, 1378–88 (2007) (arguing that there is a clash between
religious liberty and extending rights to the LGBT community and that religious liberty
should prevail).
275. See Durham, supra note 212, at 677.
276. See id at 676–77 (cautioning against excessive religious freedom claims because
if such claims “sweep too broadly, it is virtually impossible to avoid situations where most
reasonable people would agree that secular concerns trump arguably religious claims”
and that there are “many situations where it is reasonable to expect religious groups to
respect and be willing to accommodate the needs of surrounding society”). Professor
Brownstein summarized the need for acceptance of some limitations upon free exercise
as follows:
Broadly defined rights cannot always receive rigorous protection because
doing so would unreasonably interfere with the government’s ability to fur-
ther the public good. No democratic society will surrender its power to
pursue interests that conflict with rights so completely and irrevocably. Insis-
tence on a rigid commitment to rigorous review risks an obvious response:
the scope of the right will be limited to only those situations in which it
does not conflict with any interests the society values or cares about.
Brownstein, supra note 133, at 82.
277. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505,
at *77 (U.S. June 30, 2014); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
278. See Durham, supra note 212, at 677 (accepting the balancing aspect of any case
involving a perceived clash between free exercise rights and governmental interests but
also noting that “the balancing occurs on scales that are at best metaphorical and that
lack any metric for quantifying what is being measured on a common scale”).
279. Abodeely, supra note 140, at 600.
280. See Curtis, supra note 197, at 184 (summarizing research concluding that the evi-
dence of biological and genetic factors in determining sexual orientation is “suggestive”
of such links).
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of homosexual conduct and violence while discrimination has mani-
fested itself in employment, housing, access to health care, family
issues (such as marriage and adoption) and public accommoda-
tions.281 This persecution and discrimination often had (and still
does have) its roots in religious belief as did race and gender dis-
crimination.282 This pattern of mistreatment also resulted in many
of the same harms suffered by victims of race and gender discrimi-
nation including economic harm and harm to the human spirit.283
Race, gender and sexual orientation should be treated identi-
cally in the context of discrimination.284 If a specific religious exemp-
tion should not be granted on the basis of race or gender, it should
not be granted on the basis of sexual orientation. In the area of public
accommodations, discriminators on religious grounds or otherwise
should not be permitted to deny goods and services to members of
the LGBT community if they are prohibited from making such
distinctions on the basis of race and gender.285
Public accommodation statutes serve three interests: the protec-
tion of human dignity by prohibiting the degradation associated with
discrimination, guaranteeing access to public establishments by im-
posing upon them a duty not to discriminate with respect to identi-
fied protected classes, and defining citizenship “based on the idea
281. Id. at 185 (discussing the history of criminality and punishment for homosexual
behavior, the prevalence of hate crimes motivated by sexual orientation in the United
States and employment discrimination directed at members of the LGBT community).
282. Id. at 187–92 (describing the history of religious arguments in support of slavery,
racial discrimination and segregation and in opposition to women’s rights and concluding
that “[p]ast advocates of racial and gender discrimination and subordination are entitled
to the same presumption of sincerity as current opponents of gay equality. Many believed
the religious argument against integration and interracial marriage, just as many people
believe the religious arguments against gay equality and liberty”).
283. Id. at 186.
284. Id. at 177.
285. Professor Curtis admits that the analogy between race, gender and sexual
orientation is not perfect. For example, race and gender are readily identifiable physical
characteristics whereas sexual orientation is not. As a result, unlike racial minorities
and women, members of the LGBT community could avoid discrimination by remaining
closeted. Professor Curtis contends however that members of the LGBT community lived
(and often continue to live) with a different fear, specifically, the fear of discovery and
resultant persecution and discrimination. This fear was unique to the LGBT community
and resulted in hiding one’s identity and self-silencing. According to Professor Curtis,
the identification issue does not defeat the analogy. Id. at 186–87. An additional dis-
tinction between discrimination based on status (such as being a member of a racial
minority) and discrimination based on conduct (as in the case of homosexuality) also does
not defeat the analogy. Professor Curtis contends that race discrimination was not based
exclusively on skin color but also had conduct-based aspects such as race mixing in seg-
regated facilities and interracial sexual conduct. Consequently, race discrimination may
be based as much on an objection to the conduct of racial intermingling as discrimination
against the LGBT community on the basis of the sexual conduct of its members. Curtis,
supra note 197, at 192–94.
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that markets seek consumers and thereby bring individuals into
central social dynamics that are a part of citizenship.” 286 The gov-
ernment has a compelling interest in the advancement of these
interests.287 A religious exemption from public accommodation statutes
on the basis of sexual orientation sends a message contrary to these
interests.288 These interests will only be advanced by “broad and
uniform application” of public accommodation statutes to all com-
mercial enterprises without exception or exemptions.289
Such a result does not denigrate religion but only recognizes
that, in the public accommodation sphere, the government’s inter-
ests outweigh those of secular for-profit enterprises seeking to dis-
criminate against members of the LGBT community on the basis of
religious belief. In this limited context, there is no persuasive jus-
tification for respecting religious convictions more than secular
beliefs.290 To inject religion into this sphere is to invite arbitrary,
unpredictable, and discriminatory results.291 Equal and non-discrim-
inatory access to public accommodations is at least the equivalent
of free exercise of religion, both are human rights to which all are
entitled to partake and enjoy. Religion can undoubtedly be freely
exercised without engaging in discriminatory practices in the com-
mercial marketplace. If such is not the case, that is, if religious liberty
cannot be fully exercised unless believers retain the right to discrim-
inate in public accommodations as they see fit, then the calculus
286. Muehlmeyer, supra note 66, at 785; see also Hunter, supra note 260, at 1634
(contending that citizenship “is not purely a creature of the state . . . . [i]mplicitly, the law
has recognized that markets have a role in constituting citizenship. . . . [P]ublic accom-
modation laws constitute one example of that acknowledgement. Markets seek con-
sumers and thereby bring previously excluded individuals into central social dynamics”);
Lauren J. Rosenblum, Equal Access of Free Speech: The Constitutionality of Public
Accommodation Laws, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1243, 1243 (1997) (describing the underlying
purpose of public accommodation statutes as “ensur[ing] that all members of society have
equal access to goods and services”).
287. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626, 628 (1984) (stating that public ac-
commodation laws reflect “the importance, both to the individual and to society, of
removing barriers to economic advancement and political and social integration that
have historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups” and further noting that these
interests are compelling).
288. As noted by Professor Curtis, “[t]he message sent by allowing religious exemptions
is that discrimination is wrong and illegal except when it is right and legal.” Curtis, supra
note 197, at 202–03.
289. Brief for New Mexico Small Businesses as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee
Vanessa Willock, supra note 245, at 2.
290. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience:
The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1248
(1994); see also West, supra note 224, at 613–23 (contending that religious exemptions lack
legal justification as there is nothing distinctive about religion that justifies granting its
privileged status over other rights).
291. See West, supra note 224, at 604–08.
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clearly favors non-discrimination over what purports to be free exer-
cise. In such a zero-sum game, “religious liberty should not trump
human rights.” 292 If indeed there is such a conflict, “it is essential
that we not privilege moral beliefs that are religiously based over
other sincerely held, core moral beliefs.”293 This country’s ongoing com-
mitment to furthering the causes of fundamental fairness and equal
protection under the law and forging a cohesive national identity
from the many requires nothing less.
CONCLUSION
Clashes between the free exercise of religion and expanded pro-
tections for the LGBT community are likely to continue and perhaps
intensify in the future. This is unsurprising given increasing accep-
tance of the LGBT community and growing support for its equal
treatment under law, acceptance and support that has expanded
rapidly in the eleven years since the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion
in Lawrence v. Texas.294 Undoubtedly sensing this rapidly changing
tide, some opponents of further expansion of gay rights have reframed
their opposition to avoid the perception of victimization of the LGBT
community associated with advocating for restrictions upon the grant-
ing of further rights and consequent continuation of second-class
status. Instead, this reframing focuses on the claim that the granting
of rights to the LGBT community infringes upon religious liberty.295
The reframing of this opposition raises many difficult and contro-
versial issues. At least one of these issues, specifically, whether for-
profit businesses may exercise religion, was resolved by the decision
in Hobby Lobby.296 Other thorny issues remain for future resolution.
These issues include what acts constitute the free exercise of reli-
gion by businesses and the reach of Hobby Lobby to other areas such
as employment and to other historically disadvantaged classes.
In the area of public accommodations, any purported conflict
between religious liberty asserted by secular for-profit businesses
and access to goods and services must be resolved in favor of the
government’s compelling interest in guaranteeing full and non-
discriminatory access for all persons. Such a result is likely to be
292. Chapman, supra note 77, at 1792.
293. Feldblum, supra note 265, at 123.
294. 539 U.S. 558, 564, 574 (2003) (holding that homosexuals have a protected liberty
interest to engage in private consensual sexual activity and that such conduct is protected
by substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution);
see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
296. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505, at
*39–*51 (U.S. June 30, 2014).
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controversial and continue the ongoing conflict between LGBT rights
and the free exercise of religion. But public accommodation statutes
cannot be expected to “eliminate disagreement or craft perfect solu-
tions [but can only be expected to] set fair terms for the market.” 297
An outcome that recognizes the rights of everyone to full and equal
participation in the marketplace for goods and services free from the
harmful effects of invidious discrimination based upon innate physi-
cal characteristics or public perceptions thereof is such a fair term.
297. Answer Brief of Appellee-Respondent, supra note 1, at 39.
